



# Working Overtime: Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey

## Citation

Martel, Frances I. 2009. Working Overtime: Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey. Bachelor's thesis, Harvard College.

## Permanent link

<http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:5112927>

## Terms of Use

This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at <http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#LAA>

## Share Your Story

The Harvard community has made this article openly available.  
Please share how this access benefits you. [Submit a story](#).

[Accessibility](#)

# **Working Overtime: Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey**

A thesis presented

by

Frances I. Martel

Presented to the

Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree with honors

of Bachelor of Arts

Harvard College

March 2009

## *Table of Contents*

<u>Chapter 1: Introduction to Multiple-Office Holding.....</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>Academia and the Practice of Multiple-Office Holding Over Time.....</u>	<u>8</u>
<u>What is an Urban Political Machine?.....</u>	<u>10</u>
<u>The Elusive Modern Machine.....</u>	<u>13</u>
<u>New Immigration and the Fully Expanded City.....</u>	<u>16</u>
<u>Filling up the Near-Empty New Jersey Academic Pool.....</u>	<u>23</u>
<b><u>PART I: A Historical Survey of Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey.....</u></b>	<b><u>25</u></b>
<u>Chapter 2: The Origins and Evolution of Multiple-Office Holding in History.....</u>	<u>25</u>
<u>Multiple-Office Holding in the Legislature by the Numbers: Findings...29</u>	
<u>Magnifying Multiple-Office Holding: 1988-2008.....</u>	<u>37</u>
<u>Multiple-Office Holding Beyond Time: Party and Gender.....</u>	<u>40</u>
<u>Chapter 3: The New Jersey Multiple-Office Holding Ban as a 2008 Novelty....</u>	<u>44</u>
<u>Multiple-Office Holding in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.....</u>	<u>45</u>
<u>Double-Dipping and the “Republican” Opposition.....</u>	<u>50</u>
<u>The 2007 Political Forecast: Cloudy with a Chance of Subpoenas.....</u>	<u>54</u>
<u>The Law of the Land: Results.....</u>	<u>57</u>
<b><u>PART 2: A Geographical Survey of Multiple-Office Holding in NJ.....</u></b>	<b><u>61</u></b>
<u>Chapter 4: Mapping Out Multiple-Office Holding.....</u>	<u>61</u>
<u>District Evaluations: 1988-2008.....</u>	<u>63</u>
<u>Defining the Urban: Foreign-Born and Poverty-Stricken Population.....</u>	<u>69</u>
<u>District 9 and Atlantic County: A Statewide Anomaly.....</u>	<u>68</u>
<u>Chapter 5: The Legislature Goes to War.....</u>	<u>79</u>
<u>The Multiple-Office Holding Kings of Hudson County.....</u>	<u>84</u>
<u>The 2007 State Senate Election Heats Up.....</u>	<u>87</u>
<u>Sacco and Connors: Multiple-Office Holding Across the Spectrum.....</u>	<u>93</u>
<u>Chapter 6: The Democratic Upsides to Multiple-Office Holding.....</u>	<u>101</u>
<u>Corzine, McGreevey, and Urbanization.....</u>	<u>104</u>
<u>O’Neill’s Eight Objections to Multiple-Office Holding.....</u>	<u>108</u>
<i>Bibliography.....</i>	<i>113</i>
<i>Appendices.....</i>	<i>125</i>

“If I abandon this project I would be a man without dreams and I don't want to live like that: I live my life or I end my life with this project.” –Werner Herzog, on *Fitzcarraldo*



## **CHAPTER 1: Introduction**

Union City, New Jersey, is a unique place. Twice as dense as New York City and less than a mile from Manhattan, it has a front-row seat to the world's most exciting goings-on and is a product of such a lengthy process of urban sprawl that it is well beyond being on the sidelines of urban life. It is entirely its own place, with a culture heavily flavored by its overwhelming Latin American majority and its many restaurants and businesses.

The sport of choice in Union City is politics, and the politician of choice Brian P. Stack, its mayor of eight years. Every single person in Union City has a tie to the man—"Brian"—he is referred to only by first name—"found me my apartment," they explain, or "Brian got me this job," or "Brian's civic association filed my taxes." Most that have government jobs called Stack directly on his cellular phone for help to get it (his number is common knowledge). Those that do not work directly under his rule sell advertisements to the mayor or receive social aid from his Civic Association. In his eight years of governing and ten in the Union City political game (he lost his first mayoral election in 1998 against the "Alliance" machine of now-Senator Robert Menendez), Stack—a native of Union City of Irish background—has somehow acquired the support of the roughly 82% Latin American population of the city, many of which is immigrant-based.

Stack is now doing double-duty as Mayor and State Senator for his district. The latter title he earned in November 2007 after the previous incumbent, Bernard Kenny, stepped down and paved the way for one of the fiercest local primaries the Hudson County Democrats had ever experienced, where Stack

defeated neighboring mayor Silverio “Sal” Vega of West New York in a landslide despite the latter being backed by the official Democratic local chapter, the HCDO. Stack had already become accustomed to the regular trips to Trenton (about a two-hour drive from Union City) through serving in the State Assembly for four years.

At a local event on August 6, 2008 in which Stack sets up a tent in a local street and discusses community issues with residents on a one-on-one basis, the locals expressed their admiration for the mayor. The event came a day after a very successful National Night Out Against Crime annual event that featured free food, government information, and entertainment and was attended by several powerful New Jersey politicians. Governor Jon Corzine was in attendance, as were US Senator Frank Lautenberg and US Congressman Albio Sires, who despite being a former mayor of West New York was an ally of Stack’s through the state senate primaries. Like all Stack events, this one also served free hot dogs.

“He has been the only mayor to give back to the people in this way,” said a man who wished to remain unidentified, but relayed that he had lived in Union City for 30 years since arriving from Cuba. “And he is a *gringo*!” the man continued, a Latin American colloquialism for American Caucasians. “When one of our race was in office, all he did was steal, and the *gringo* comes in and keeps our city running.” Stack had been elected in a 2000 recall election prompted by the alleged corruption of previous mayor Rudy Garcia, a member of the Cuban exile community. It is worthy of note that Union City is no stranger to Latino mayors, being the natural stomping grounds of US Senator Bob Menendez who

had served as mayor in the 1980s. For Stack, the Cuban community had been the most difficult constituency to hold on to, since many in the community had formerly worked with Garcia, against whom Stack had run and lost by a narrow margin in 1998. Union City is home to the largest number of Cuban Americans in the nation, excepting, of course, Miami, Florida, making the population an important chunk of the constituency. But today, eight years after taking office and one after defeating a local Cuban politician in a state senate race, the Cuban Union City residents had finally started to come around. Another couple who had come to the “Bringing the Government to the People Event,” as Stack’s mail invites had labeled it, echoed the same positive remarks of their compatriot who laid such emphasis on Stack’s Irish background. The Hernandez’ had come from Cuba in the 1970s, preceding the Mariel boatlift but succeeding the first wave of wealthy Cuban landowners to escape. They had lived in Union City—on the quaint Cottage Place in between major roads Kennedy Blvd. and Bergenline Ave., to be precise—the entire time. They sent their three sons to Union Hill High School, a relic of the days when Union City had not yet been fused from the remains of West Hoboken and Union Hill. Manuel Hernandez, the head of the family, had been a banker all his life and saved enough money to buy two houses on Cottage Place. Lifelong Republicans, as octogenarians they embraced the initiatives of their liberal mayor. “We have his cell phone number in our phone book, just like everyone else in Union City,” Manuel explained in Spanish. “When one of our houses burned down a few years ago, we were devastated, but Brian was there with us the whole time. It was 3 AM and we couldn’t sleep, and

Brian was there watching the firefighters work, and helped us rebuild and get back on our feet. We are very thankful to him because he cares about this city and about us more than any other mayor we have seen here. When I hear the rumors about him stealing—they have all stolen, but Brian builds here and gives back. And,” the charismatic elderly man ends with a now-familiar phrase, “he’s a *gringo*. Who would’ve thought?”

The ethnic rift between Stack and his constituency certainly adds another layer of complexity to the argument that such populism is native to Latin America. After all, in many ways Stack is more of a coelacanth of late 19<sup>th</sup>/early 20<sup>th</sup> century Irish politics. Something about the free turkeys for Thanksgiving and hot dogs for the 4<sup>th</sup> of July screams the best of Tammany Hall. But most interesting about the Brian Stack case is that he can be so connected to his city’s residents while spending at least half of the week legislating in Trenton, a two-hour drive away. It turns out that Stack is not alone in his ability to government multiple constituencies, and his attitude towards his people and the manner in which he handles the mayorship reflect in part a subculture of New Jersey politics that few scholars have ventured to study: the phenomenon of multiple-office holding.

The case of Union City will be a key example in helping to explain the behaviors of New Jersey voters and the people they elect to serve. It is one of an assortment of towns and cities across the state that can choose with which title they address their mayor, whether they are state legislator, freeholder, or other types of municipal leaders. Before beginning the research for this study, it was

abundantly clear that this method of governing was not precisely something one would be able to call commonplace across the nation. In fact, a little more digging suggests that very few places in America allow for multiple-office holding, and of the few that do it is never as prevalent as it is in New Jersey. The 2008 numbers, for example, demonstrate that the New Jersey Legislature had 22 multiple-office holders in 2007.

For decades, New Jersey politicians have viewed multiple-office holding as an integral part of the urban power structure. To rise up in the totem pole, one must collect public office jobs until finding a comfortable resting place of power. While not particularly common in the less populated areas of the state, urban centers like the aforementioned Hudson County, Newark, and Camden have a tradition of sending their leaders off to Trenton without making them relinquish their jobs at home. And yet it was these very state legislators that passed a ban on the practice into law in February 2008. Supported by senator-turned-governor Jon Corzine, the ban passed with the support of political leaders like Stack and Sacco. On paper and in the pages of the *New York Times* it read like a rare and barely believable victory for political morality in what longtime NJ political journalists Bob Ingle and Sandy McClure call “The Soprano State”. If it sounded barely believable, it is probably because in practice it was not. A grandfather clause in the law keeps those currently in two positions of power safe from the wrath of the law.

This study intends answer several questions regarding the phenomenon of multiple-office holding and its sudden “extinction” in New Jersey. Most of the

issues discussed in this study are divided into two categories: why multiple-office holding exists at all and its history within the state, and the specifics regarding the ban itself. On a micro level, it aspires to investigate why late 2007/early 2008 was an opportune time for such a law and where this grandfather clause arose from and why. Although the tradition has existed previously in less populated areas of New Jersey, especially in the 1940s, at some point (peaking in the 1990s) dual-office holding became an essential component in the structure of an urban political machine. On a macro level, this study seeks to explain the place of such a practice in the creation and maintenance of the traditional urban political machine, a structure with a lush history in New Jersey that is still alive and kicking today. It attempts to begin a dialogue with existing literature on urban politics centered around the practice of dual-office holding. I have decided to tackle both issues through two different lenses of understanding: time and place.

In Part I of my study, I approach the history of multiple-office holding and its ban through time. When and how did this practice take hold, and what was so distinct about the year 2007 that it would lead to the legislature's opinion on the matter changing so dramatically? I propose that the practice has been established within the state for nearly a century, but it was only when New Jersey's metropolitan areas began to grow significantly thanks to immigration that we can see the grand expansion of the practice across the state. The ban in 2007 was a product both of this growth (it created a backlash from legislators that were not deeply entrenched in places where this practice was acceptable) and of the aftermath of the James McGreevey Administration's complete implosion.

McGreevey, a multiple-office holder himself, had many allies in the same dual-office holding boat as he in the legislature, but with the corruption allegations and the Golan Cipel scandal that took him down, he gave his successor, Jon Corzine, the opportunity to purge (or at the very least contain) McGreevey's allies, who were not yet loyal to Corzine since they had just watched the latter expel their leader from the highest office in the state.

Part II of my study proposes that investigating merely the temporal aspects of multiple-office holding in New Jersey creates a false impression that politics within the state is homogenized enough to do so. Nothing could be further from the truth. Using the data collected from the State Archives in Trenton on state legislators and their other jobs, I plotted their appearances in the state across a map of New Jersey to discover whether there was an even distribution of multiple-office holders across the state. That the practice has existed for decades is not specific enough information, although we do know that immigration had much to do with the expansion of multiple-office holding. I will argue in Part II of my thesis that multiple-office holding exists almost exclusively (or at least as part of the accepted culture) in urban areas, urban defined by population density, number of foreign-born residents, and number of individuals under the poverty line. Using these three variables, we can see that places like Hudson, Essex, and Passaic Counties are more vulnerable to the approach of a multiple-office holder than less populous, more homogenous places like Cape May or Warren Counties.

Given then what we know about multiple-office holding—that it is well established in urban centers across the state for years and the ban was in part

influenced by Corzine/McGreevey turf warfare—we can then evaluate what the fragmentation of political culture in New Jersey means for the state of things within the legislature in 2007. The second half of Part II discusses the issues facing multiple-office holders in 2007 and the political climate in which the ban was passed. Specifically, it turns to the case study of the 2007 State Senate elections in District 33, where two mayors fought an intense campaign against each other for the seat. Here also we examine the way other multiple-office holders within the legislature felt about the matter, what positions they were in at the time, and how they voted. It turns out that 2007 was an especially good time to pass a multiple-office holding ban because the number of politicians practicing this skyrocketed and, in multiple-office holding enclaves, they were particularly powerful and vicious towards each other, enough to make for a good propaganda campaign against the practice itself.

### **Academia and the Practice of Multiple-Office Holding Over Time**

New Jersey, to many individuals in the rest of the nation, is an anachronistic time capsule stuffed to the brim with America's greatest national questionable behavior. It serves as a dumping ground for those from other states to leave their least attractive memories behind: Bon Jovi, women with platinum bleached teased hair, and the long-discarded political ethics of Huey Long and Boss Tweed. While the state has rivals in Illinois and Rhode Island for colorfully criminal political characters, its singularly machine-based political structure stands alone in the nation. It is precisely the uniqueness of this system epitomized by its rigidity and extended historical tradition that this study seeks to expand on.



Political scientists establish their careers on patterns. They strive to find places, people, events and organizations that superficially have nothing in common but function on some level in a similar way. This does not bode well for the political scientist studying New Jersey, and most certainly not for one attempting to comprehend the whys and hows of multiple-office holding, a practice legally banned in most states. For the year 2009, the organized political machines of New Jersey stand in a class all their own. Thus, this study will be applying a great amount of literature and political science studies from elsewhere in America's political timeline.

I intend here to outline the major bodies of political science literature that will be contributing to my study, as well as major works that have influenced the piece. As the acquisition of multiple offices serves to limit the number of people with public service positions to the benefit of political machine leaders that find smaller numbers of individuals easier to manipulate, the literature on political machines, especially those in the New York/New Jersey area, is key to this study and will be discussed in depth here. There will also be a brief skim of the literature on multiple-office holding, but this literature is extremely rare and often obsolete.<sup>1</sup> After outlining the broader reaches of my study I propose to narrow the study back down to New Jersey and discuss the history of the state in political science. I would like to propose that literature regarding new waves of immigrants to New Jersey in the 1970s and 1980s invalidates claims by earlier literature that

---

<sup>1</sup> For example, one of the most extensive studies on multiple-office holding heavily quotes Montesquieu as a main figure in the debate on the subject (Conklin 1945, 333)).

the rise of Irish and Italian immigrants after several generations into the higher classes left a patronage void in the cities.

### **What is an Urban Political Machine?**

Those most closely in the know about the way political machines work in New Jersey are not scholars, but journalists who have spent their lifetimes denouncing the corruption inherent in the machines. They have narrowly tailored their definition of a machine, and it deviates little from the definition of an urban political machine scholars use to study Tammany Hall et al. “In New Jersey,” write Gannett NJ journalists Bob Ingle and Sandy McClure, “government is not about taking care of what people can’t do for themselves. It’s about jobs” (Ingle 2007, 4). They continue, expanding on how bosses employ their control of jobs to build a system of clientelism where they trade votes for jobs (Ingle 2007, 4-7). Bosses are a series of political leaders who may or may not hold public office but control the states money: the funding needed to run campaigns (Ingle 72). According to *Asbury Park Press* investigations editor Paul D’Ambrosio, “a candidate anointed by a boss is then blessed with an almost bottomless pit of campaign cash. Candidates who displease a boss are denied the campaign money needed to buy expensive media ads or mail out glossy fliers” (D’Ambrosio 2004).

Most scholars vary in their definition of an old (circa 1900) political machine in nuanced ways, and the fact that New Jersey has not deviated much in its machine structures from those studied a century ago allows scholars to continue to employ older literature in the definition of this. Additionally, those that study the closest species of machine to that existing today—the urban

American political machine of the turn of the century— have a pretty narrow view of what constitutes a machine. Steven Erie, whose book *Rainbow's End* is the premier piece on the construction of the urban political machine, defines the machine almost exclusively around the creation of jobs. “The party machine,” he explains, organized the electorate in order to control the tangible benefits of public office— patronage, services, contracts, and franchises.” Rather than use any ideology or political appeal to garner votes, the machine offers these benefits and indebts the constituency into loyalty (Erie 1990, 2).

Others prefer to define the machine in terms of pure power, not necessarily job creating ability. David Mayhew, for example, whose study *Placing Parties in American Politics* is a state-by-state survey of party organization in America, prefers to define the machine by control of public service positions. He makes a distinction between machines and “traditional party organizations” by limiting the scope of machines to cities and counties. Traditional Party Organizations, or TPOs, are basically what Erie defines as machines, but with a broader range of influence and a much more established historical precedent behind them. In most ways, machines on a local level are TPOs, yet not all TPOs (due to the extent of their influence) are machines (Mayhew 1986, 19-21).

Fred Greenstein, in his study of the “Old-Style Political Machine,” splits the definition of the machine into four parts, three of which apply completely to our situation today, and the fourth highlighting the major difference between the machines of yore and those of today. He explains that there needs to be a

disciplined party hierarchy under one leader or small group that effectively controls nomination to public office and maintains a loyal constituency through material rewards (Greenstein 1964, 3). This is quite consistent with Erie's definition, although he enhances it by expanding rewards to "nonideological psychic rewards" (camaraderie, ethnic recognition, etc), and specifies that party bosses needn't hold public office at all, and that most do not. Thomas Guterbock agrees in his body of work, adding to this definition that patronage is a cyclical activity, and that machines must win elections to be able to dispense benefits just as much as it needs to distribute perks in order to win elections (Guterbock 1980, 4).

Despite the radical shift from needing no jobs at all to become a boss to engaging in as many as four at a time—one that will be discussed later—this adheres quite clearly to the definitions given by the group of New Jersey journalists today. The literature quite unanimously agrees with Greenstein and Erie, and, since this study is remaining within the confines of New Jersey legislative government, with Mayhew's as well, regarding this definition. Other sources of note that define machines similarly include studies by M. Craig Brown and Charles Halaby, John C. Scott, and Clarence Stone, among others (see bibliography).

### **The Elusive Modern Machine**

The consensus among political scientists seems to be that the structure of the political machine as defined above is a fossil of American political history, an amusing ethnic phenomenon in American cities between the late 1800s and up

until the assimilation of white ethnics into mainstream American culture, which is a date that ranges in estimations from post-WWII to the 1980s, but in most cases is certainly far behind us. Erie's study of the Irish political machines built upon the heavy flow of Irish immigrants into America in the late 19<sup>th</sup>/early 20<sup>th</sup> century spans the years 1840 to 1985, shortly before the work was published. However, in it Erie suggests that the machines, once having passed their embryonic stage (when immigrants are naturalized and bought with patronage) and their consolidation stage (where the machines begin pushing their leaders to win elections), found trouble in rising from their own ashes after being severely weakened by the New Deal. The New Deal strengthened labor coalitions and many who benefited from it who were once dependent on patronage moved upward in the classes and were no longer impressed by this power. The argument continues that the budget cuts on social programs by Republicans post-New Deal (especially in the Reagan era) made it nearly impossible for machines to offer anything in exchange for votes (Erie 1990, 16-17).

Other scholars give the political machine a slightly longer lifespan—Mayhew studying “party organization” in the 1960s in his 1986 book and finding the need to employ the term “machine” when discussing New Jersey, Illinois, and a small number of similar states. Guterbock, writing in 1980, also allows that the New Deal did not kill political machines, but follows this trend with reservation for the future, despite noting Chicago as “a marked deviation” from other cities (13). He quotes colleague Samuel Eldersveld: “On the way out, presumably, is the ‘old-style’ local politics, with its discipline, personal loyalty, spoils system,

welfare services, the deliverable vote, and continuous year-round attention to precinct affairs” (12).

It is possible to forgive the aforementioned scholars’ shortsightedness because of the date in which they wrote, when the Reagan cutbacks were at their most present. Yet even political scientists writing from a much more removed chronological perspective seem to agree. In his review of urban political machines and their impact on American politics, Clarence Stone engages in discussion on the nostalgia for the “good old days,” citing the political machine nostalgia phase as beginning around 1956 with the publication of Edwin O’Connor’s *The Last Hurrah* (Stone 1996, 446). Stephen Weissman attempted to study one of the most important parts of the state in this study—Jersey City, NJ—in the 1970s, searching for a post-machine political structure where white ethnics had socioeconomically outgrown the machines. Without these impoverished, not-yet-integrated masses of white immigrants, the machine, Weissman argues, has little space for development (Weissman 1976, 182-183).

It has probably become clear from the specific studies mentioned here just how quick political scientists were in burying the phenomenon. In fact, the most prominent studies discussing urban politics beyond the time of their prime are decades old, with most current political science research focusing elsewhere in the urban political sector. Some scholars have focused on explicitly limiting the power of municipal government. Paul Peterson’s *City Limits*, for example, is a study dedicated to proving that cities are nothing without federal support; that is to say, the study of a city without taking into consideration national contexts

presupposes that cities have an autonomy that does not exist. Although Peterson laments in 1981 that “urban political analysis has been removed once again to the periphery of political science discipline” (ix), he later claims that the goings-on in most cities are out of the control of city leaders and strongly influenced by higher powers (Peterson 1981, 5). If this is true, then studying what happens on the grounds of cities appears obsolete, since there is nothing happening on the lower levels that is also not happening above.

Peterson is an exception to the more recent trend of urban politics. Rather than looking at the actual political issues that resonate within a city, scholars have focused their research more on the so-called “melting pot” of the American urban landscape, as well as mostly on ethnic and class warfare in the urban sector. Titles such as *Racial Politics in American Cities*, *Politics in Black and White*, *The Politics of Minority Coalitions*, and *Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America* focus considerably more on interactions between classes and racial minorities in the urban sector horizontally rather than examining much of what happens within the walls of City Hall. There is much sociological value in studying the interactions among various groups and their place in the social structure, as well as the relative strengths and weaknesses of social organizations among minority groups in the cities. However, to neglect to pay as much attention to the functioning of government at such a close local level leaves a gaping loophole in the evaluation of the efficiency of this government and the power of individual constituents to govern themselves. There is much more to modern urban politics than the fact that many individuals in cities happen to be minorities.

## **New Immigration and the Fully Expanded City**

The New Jersey of the late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century, ironically the same era that spawned the ban on multiple office-holding, defies the trend that political scientists have been following of a change in direction from the politics of “bosses” to the politics of “leaders” (Guterbock 1980, 12). Here we find political structures that fit all the above criteria for a machine: corruption, clientelism, quid pro quo politics, and, yes, the emergence of political bosses. It is as if the small, oddly shaped enclave is a political coelacanth existing much to the dismay of those political scientists that believed it was finally time to close the chapter on this specific structure. Despite the irrelevance of most studies on ethnic political coalitions and the struggles among minorities for acceptance and government benefits, continuation of machine politics has much to do with the introduction of new ethnic minorities into the cities. Erie, Weissman, Guterbock and others fail to recognize that the depleted population of white ethnics did not mean the complete death of the machine. The two points that they discuss as having nailed the coffin for the machines—the integration of white ethnics into the mainstream (mostly Weissman) and the elimination of further city expansion by the limits of urban sprawl—a point made by Erie to be discussed very soon—have been replaced by very steady substitutes. These scholars failed to anticipate in their studies two very important social events particularly of significance to New Jersey residents that occurred in the past three decades.

Looking historically at the way political machines have organized themselves in New Jersey over time, an argument could be made that it is not a



complete expansion of these machines that has occurred but, rather, the change in ethnic composition has benefited some machines to the expense of others. Citing a study by John Blydenburgh, David Mayhew points out that, despite (as we will see later) inter-party competition not being a significant factor in machine building or the development of multiple-office holding, machines are divided by party as much as by region. Blydenburgh divided the New Jersey machines into twelve subdivisions, six Democrat and six Republican, in the 1960s<sup>2</sup>. For the most part, these divisions by party still remain (Bergen County Democrats being one of the major new characters since the study) (Mayhew 1986, 49). However, the ethnic and socioeconomic divides that once existed in the time of this study have dramatically changed. To keep consistent the argument put forth by Weissman et al that poor white ethnics are necessary for the development of a machine one must ignore that the dynamics of New Jersey, thanks to a great influx of immigrants that, while otherwise mostly the same as white ethnics politically, come from areas such as Latin America and are equally susceptible to use by patronage-brandish elements. These populations have taken over many of the counties that were once great political centers and fed the political machines there, also to the demise of a few of them, mostly on the Republican side. And, as we will see in future chapters, the influx of new immigrants into these pre-established machines has changed the dynamics of many of the state's most popular areas for multiple-office holding.

---

<sup>2</sup> Republican: Atlantic County, Bergen County, Cape May County, Burlington County, Somerset County, and Monmouth County. Democrat: Hudson County, Essex County, Camden County, Mercer County, Passaic County, and Middlesex County. (Mayhew 48-49).

Turning to this very specific machine practice, the changing populations, especially those that were both increasing and redefining the culture of many machine-controlled areas, created a more fertile atmosphere for multiple-office holding. Many scholars comment that most political bosses from the golden days needed only one publicly elected job to maintain their power. They were mostly mayors or other major local figures with very long outstretching influence to the outside world, due to their manipulation of patronage and votes. Boss William M. Tweed, for example, was never a US Congressman while he was in the New York State Senate or the New York City Board of Advisors. Their influence was significantly cut short as their constituencies became wealthier; after all, since their main way of garnering votes was to register poor voters and given them social benefits and jobs, the ascent of these poor people (mostly white ethnics) was bad news to the bosses (Stone 1996, 448). The boss's influence was cut short. The voters were not under complete control, since by the second generation they were America-born citizens with the opportunities of education and, eventually a bourgeois or even higher-class lifestyle. The bosses technically only had the powers vested in them by their single job, and without the support they could not bend this power as they were once capable of doing. The influx of immigrants could only feed the machine for so long, although the poorer populations who always demand social programs and government money to maintain afloat were helpful in maintaining the multiple-office holding tradition. Besides the main arguments laid in the following paragraphs regarding the permanence of multiple-office holding, it appears rational for a group of lower-income individuals who

construct the backbone of a machine to want their party boss to take a more powerful role in state politics and have more control over the distribution of funding to their district.

In the past, the fluid construction of cities made it unnecessary to bother with two jobs when the pool of loyal constituents began to evaporate as they rose in socioeconomic status. Steven Erie contends that one way in which bosses maintained a fluid pool of patronage recipients under their control was merely to expand the cities to include them. This was particularly common in what most political scholars consider the “golden age” of political machines. For example, between 1880 and 1990, the twenty largest cities in America increased their territory by nearly one-third. He explains, “machine politicians pursued an aggressive annexation program to enlarge the city’s boundaries and revenue base” (56). To employ expansion and absorption of neighboring immigrant towns as a main tool for maintaining upright a machine means that, today, in a nation where there is little elsewhere for cities to expand, once the supply of immigrant voters is depleted, there is no further feeding the machine. Returning to the New York example, in today’s America it would be unbelievable for the city to expand itself beyond its borders to, say, the New Jersey urban sector, and irrational to expand to the upper-class neighborhoods north of the City. Thus, the machine, if one were to still exist, would have no population to do business with once all of its immigrants and poor were naturalized and aided by the government enough to become middle-class, apolitical entities.

To argue that the machines survived, it is necessary to point out a mechanism by which they would have done so, either a method of expansion or a new population to engage in clientelism. Without these two items it makes perfect sense for the machines to have died off sometime after the New Deal, when most managed to pull themselves up and out of a position where a machine could offer them patronage jobs and government money in exchange for votes. Here I propose both. If politicians cannot expand the scope of their current constituency the way they once did through land expansion, they can just acquire a new one—at least in pre-2008 New Jersey, where laws against multiple-office holding did not stand. A mayor of a small town with no real discernable suburbs or strong influx of immigrants, such as Mayor Leonard Connors of Surf City, NJ, could expand his influence from his small town of 1, 549 people (*US Census 2005*) to an entire district of 233, 745 (*Rutgers NJ Databook 2008*) without having to do much legal work—just a legislative campaign. Of course, multiple-office holding becomes a much more efficient expansion technique in the urban sectors because of the class status of many residents and the population density—the greatest in the nation. For example, the mayor of Union City, NJ, Mayor Brian P. Stack, has a constituency of 62, 715 individuals under his 1.2 square-mile terrain (*Us Census 2007*). By also assuming the state senator position in 2008, Stack expands his influence to 206, 676 individuals throughout the district. Yet more importantly, of these individuals under the 33<sup>rd</sup> district's control, 46.4% are foreign born as of the year 2000, and 57.5% are of Latin American descent. (*Rutgers 2008*). Not only does having two offices then increase the scope of influence by sheer numbers,

but now leaders have a way of finding minority populations to manipulate with voter registration, patronage, and social benefit support to feed the machine. This is aided by the many years of careful gerrymandering that has lead to some of the strangest-looking congressional districts in America.<sup>3</sup>

The Latin American population, especially in Hudson County, has been the crux of the continuation of machine politics. Replacing the white ethnics in the 1970s in places like Bayonne, Jersey City, Elizabeth, and Camden were flocks of Latin Americans, particularly Cuban-Americans fleeing from the communist Cuban Revolution. Already fairly adjusted to clientele politics, these immigrants were greeted by politicians descending from the white ethnics once controlled by tradition machines, who were willing to aid them with social benefits and, after the necessary allotted time, suffrage, in exchange for votes. Another notable population with no voter registration issues trickling into New Jersey at the time was the New York-based Puerto Ricans searching for a better life out of Upper Manhattan. Their presence in these areas create urban “safe spaces” for Spanish-speaking populations who were fleeing from more white-populated, racially uncomfortable areas of the nation. To this day, New Jersey is shadowed only by the much larger California and New York in percentage of immigrant population (*FAIR 2008*). What this means for party identification, a topic only tangentially related to multiple-office holding since, as this study will later explain, many times multiple-office holding functions to unite legislators much the same way

---

<sup>3</sup> For example, on a national level, District 13 now represented by Congressman Albio Sires of West New York, NJ, is divided into two pieces that span Hudson County but somewhat curiously include parts of Union and Middlesex Counties.

party ID does, is that in many areas that were once great machine centers for one party, the identification has shifted. With the exception of the Cuban-American lobby, most Latin American voters identify with the Democratic Party traditionally. Their arrival in centers that were once Republican in the 1960s like Monmouth and Atlantic Counties have breathed air into the multiple-office holding tradition, but have also strengthened the Democratic Party there, as will be proven in further chapters. Bergen County has also been the victim of urban sprawl and beginning to resemble neighbors Hudson and Essex more than Republican strongholds like Morris County, and is one of the more active multiple-office holding areas in the state. What's more, further study has demonstrated that areas like Burlington County that continue to be Republican where the new immigrants have not prominently settled have begun to lag behind other Democratic areas in public servants with multiple offices (see Chapter 4).

Because the literature has currently been insufficient in the study of multiple-office holding as an individual tool for the construction of a political machine, much of my work will have to occur in the field. I will prove with data extracted from State Legislative biographical sketches in the *Legislative Manual of the State of New Jersey* that multiple office holding was on the rise closely before the ban was passed (along with immigration). As journalists Ingle and McClure are wont to say, nothing happens in New Jersey unless it benefits a higher power politically or economically. I will explore the precise place of this practice in the culture and development of a political machine with interviews

with both recipients of patronage, longtime witnesses to the development of machines, and machine bosses (or developing bosses) themselves.

### **Filling Up the Near-Empty New Jersey Academic Pool**

Previous examination of the academic literature related to local politics in areas like New Jersey reveals a comfortably wide niche for the study of multiple-office holding. Even those studying localized municipal or even state politics will find that they have a significantly more shallow pool of forebears on which to base their literature than their counterparts interested in larger national trends. Moreover, studies examining New Jersey's very particular flavor of intense local politics and corruption are often the creation of individuals deeply embedded in the system, and as such are often descriptive journalistic endeavors that would be frowned upon by the more "sophisticated" elements of the academic community. For the researcher, this translated into a deeper exploration of the world from which these activities arise: the culture that allows levels of multiple-office holding that other states would deem obscene, then tears down the practice on paper while even more politicians slip through the loopholes and into the legislature.

A significant slice will attempt to comprehend multiple-office holding in New Jersey over time and across its relatively small yet diverse geography. In order to develop an argument regarding the positive and negative effects of banning "double-dipping" in the state, as well as the why and how behind how this bill passed in a legislature previously so warm to double-dippers, one must understand just how deeply embedded the practice is in the state, and who

benefited historically. The second large chunk of research involves studying the practice on a micro-level, although also historically. Speaking to those individuals directly engrossed in the practice and those that were there to watch and vote on the bill that removed multiple-office holding from the New Jersey Legislature enhances the statistics taken from public and private records with personal experiences and opinions from those that have actually dedicated a significant amount of their lives to politics, rather than those that merely study it. Once the blanket influence of the practice has been examined, the specifics can take shape through taking a look at the individuals involved.



*PART I: A Historical Survey of Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey*

**CHAPTER 2: The Evolution of Multiple-Office Holding in History**

Holding a state office allows for enough power in a larger territory and more access to state funds, making the numbers big enough to study as opposed to, say, an office that only expands the constituency to a countywide level. The expansion of power makes the discrepancies between single-office and multiple-office politicians more distinct than they would on a local level. As such, they lead to temptation for single-office holders that are not afraid to bite off more than they can chew, and equally inspire the ire of powerful figures who have denied themselves the double salary and pension but maintained significant influence, such as Governor Jon Corzine. As important a character as Corzine is, however, to fully understand multiple-office holding one must study the main players in the game before the chaperone that shuts it down. While finding every multiple-office holder in every level of government within New Jersey would be the most thorough investigation of the matter, the organization and availability of archives limits the study. There is a record of individuals who have served in the New Jersey legislature spanning time from the present back until about 1870; however, there is no uniform record of individuals that have served in other local offices, such as Freeholder<sup>4</sup> or City Council positions. Due to the lack of cohesive

---

<sup>4</sup> The Board of Chosen Freeholders is a government body unique to the state of New Jersey that functions on the county level. It is the legislative body of each of the 21 counties of the state. The term “Freeholder” is unique in American politics, as per the New Jersey Constitution of 1776, and stems from the fact that county legislatures were required to have a “clear estate”, or a “freehold”. In modern New Jersey, each county has a legislature with numbers of their choosing depending on respective populations, and in many the Board merely passes any legislation that goes through the County Executive (“What is a Freeholder?” 2007).

information on smaller, more numerous bodies in the state, it appeared more efficient to leave the study of multiple-office holding on a municipal level to a researcher dedicated exclusively to the subject.

The pertinent information on multiple-office holding at the legislative level in this work was collected from a series of government almanacs called the *Manual of the Legislature of New Jersey*. According to the online records and glossary of the New Jersey Legislature itself, the books are also commonly referred to as *Fitzgerald's Red Book* or *Fitzgerald's Legislative Manual* ("NJ Legislature Glossary" 2008). They are named after Thomas F. Fitzgerald, a fixture in the Trenton literature and journalism scene in the 19<sup>th</sup> century who dedicated his career outside of local media to editing the manuals for forty years, as well as the *Trenton City Directory* (Cleary 1929). They are private publications, but the only ones of their kind in New Jersey, and the most thoroughly informed almanacs of the state government. Miscellaneous volumes of them are kept in New Jersey university libraries as well, but it is rare to find a complete collection of them. The most complete collections are to be found in two places: the New Jersey State Archives and the New Jersey State Library, both in Trenton.

Among the highlights of the books are information on the executive and judicial branches, thorough biographies of the governor at the time (except in cases when there is an interim governor), and bills passed in the year of publication, they contain biographical sketches of all the legislators in a given year, separated by chamber. These sketches often include a series of information

relative to the legislative and private lives of the senators and assemblymen, beginning often with birthdates and places and family members, and also highlighting specific bills or issues that are of particular interest to the legislator. Almost always one can find a paragraph on the previous experience of the legislator in public office, and here is where one would find such information as whether the legislator has held a job simultaneously with the state-wide job he or she currently holds. Also of note in the biographical sketches are the familial relationships between some of the legislators, noting how some seats are sometimes “passed down” through generations.

To first find and collect the books required a trip to the state’s capital, Trenton, and permission to enter the New Jersey State Archives<sup>5</sup>. This study will concern itself only with the past 70 years of multiple-office holding in the state, from 1934-2008<sup>6</sup>.

---

<sup>5</sup> Trenton is a city so heavily overcome with its own reputation as a crime-ridden wasteland that its very obvious attempts at aestheticizing its deplorable condition give the appearance of the caked-on make up on a former model desperate to retain her beauty. Every street is lined with government buildings that recall a time of significant grandeur in its history that clearly passed long ago, much in the way that its coastal cousin, Atlantic City, is littered with historically significant landmarks overridden by the city’s contemporary atmosphere. Trenton, however, has no ocean or casinos; the only escape from the claustrophobic peach-colored landscape is across the murky Delaware River.

<sup>6</sup> The methodology behind compiling this information was much more meticulously applied to the last 20 years of legislative history, as in order to explain the ban it was significantly more necessary to fact-check and be near 100% certain of the accuracy of the number of multiple-office holders in the years preceding the ban, while all the years previous are merely necessary to establish a precedent for this kind of behavior in state history. Thus, errors are more likely to occur within the years before 1988, although attempts were made to limit the number of discrepancies in as many years as possible.

Once having acquired the necessary records, I began to compile a list of multiple-office holders using the information in the biographical sketches. I narrowed the definition of a second office to any high office in the executive department of a city or county and/or any elected office. For the most part, this definition includes but is not limited to mayoral positions, freeholder/county positions, and no appointed jobs. It does not include elected party offices, however, which some may argue should be included in the study of multiple-office holding because of the power which they give when coupled with a geographically favorable area to the given party.<sup>7</sup>

The biographies of some legislators that were to be found on their websites or in alternative press sources did not match the ones in the legislative manuals. The most prominent example of this is former Union City mayor Raul “Rudy” Garcia, who also served as a state assemblyman for the 33<sup>rd</sup> District while he was in office. A dark cloud of suspicion regarding the mayor's administration of municipal finances and rumors related to a domestic abuse probe (according to members of the Brian Stack Change ’98 campaign team) hung quite low over Garcia’s tenure, climaxing in a proposed recall election against him led by current mayor Brian P. Stack. Mayor Garcia resigned shortly after being assaulted by the one-two punch of the attempted recall vote and a state investigation on his activities (Strunsky 2000). Possibly because of the turmoil surrounding him,

---

<sup>7</sup> While the objective of this study is to reach a conclusion on elected offices and the power they give to politicians to construct machines, the topic of party leadership will also be addressed. Party leaders who also have business in the legislature will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, which discusses the interview process.

Mayor Garcia's biographical sketches in the *Legislative Manual* are distinguished by their lack of insight into Garcia both as a person and a politician, and do not include the fact that Garcia was ever mayor of Union City. The fact that the legislator was, indeed, simultaneously serving as mayor was verified by reports in the *New York Times* (Strunsky 2000).

Given the nature of the sketch, which stood out in the book for its length and the lack of specifics about the legislator's life and, especially, his previous political experience, it became easier as one became accustomed to the typical biographical sketch to discover similar politicians with intentionally obscured pasts. Any item that was outstandingly vague when discussing a politician's past record (careers like "activist" or "public figure") or short in length without a legitimate reason (these being an extremely short tenure in the legislature or a sudden mid-year promotion of the legislator to a higher executive branch position) was considered suspicious and confirmed by trustworthy online sources. The three Internet sources most commonly useful in this process were the state-sponsored websites of the legislators, the *New York Times*, and local newspaper sources, such as the *Star Ledger* or the *Jersey Journal*.

### **Multiple-Office Holding in the NJ Legislature By the Numbers: Findings**

Multiple-office holding in the New Jersey Legislature cannot possibly be considered a new development in the state, nor one particularly foreign to the nature of a state notorious for power struggles and corruption debacles. If politicians can make more money and accumulate more power by serving different constituencies they have little reason to refuse. On the other hand, many

in the demonized position of holding more than one office, as demonstrated further on in this study, will point to reelection ratios, legitimate community improvements, and the failures of other single-office holders around them to justify their position. To elucidate the situation would require taking into consideration the evolution of multiple-office holding as a statewide phenomenon existing for nearly a century in the state's history and perhaps more.




Figure 1 above shows the overall number of multiple-office holders in both chambers in the past 74 years. The trend, with the exception of some off years in which a large number of multiple-office holders retired and left open spots for legislators that did not hold a second office, is clearly upward. The last decade of legal multiple-office holding also saw the largest single-year increase in

the near-century preceding it. However, before engaging with the data of the past decade, the numbers for the earlier years of the legislature require some study.

The years before 1972 experienced a gradual yet persistent attempt to expand the legislature to adapt to the ever-increasing population (and population density) of the state. The numbers demonstrate a clear but inconsistent increase since 1947; before this year the trend appears weaker and more persistent towards the positive direction. 1947 was a transformative year for the state and saw the implementation of a new constitution that expanded executive power within the state to additional vetoes and placed under the executive office a new variety of organizations that were previously independent of the executive branch of the state or simply private (*NJ Legislative Manual 1947*). With this expansion came longer terms for the legislators: four years for senators and two for general assemblymen. The impact of this legislation creates four-to-six year cycles of increase and decreases in the number of multiple-office holders most visible in the divide between 1955 and 1959. In 1955 one can assess a visible decrease in the number of multiple-office holders unlike that before. This is due to an outgoing class of both senators (two terms in) and assemblymen (two to four terms in) finding replacements from career politicians with no other occupations. It takes another four years for an incoming class of multiple-office holders to take advantage of the open seats and, in some cases, for those members of the legislature to adopt a second job. Here the increase is natural and not particularly affected by any artificial factors outside of elections causing individuals to

become legislators who already held another position and establishing strong incumbents in the process.

The increase in 1966 is, on the contrary, not by the nature of the vote of the people. By this time, the population and population density of the state was growing at an increasingly rapid rate, and the first wave of immigrants from Latin America, mostly upper-class Cuban exiles fleeing the Castro regime, were settling in and taking their rightful place in the New Jersey constituencies. In order to accommodate these new immigrants, the state attempted another expansion of both its chambers. The Senate was expanded from 21 to 40 members and the General Assembly from 60 to 80, thus making the total number of new and potential multiple-office holders 120.<sup>8</sup> With this expansion, a new crop of multiple-office holders were elected to the legislature that have little impact on the percentage change, nor does this increase correlate to any significant stimulus for an increase in multiple-office holding.

As argued in the introduction, one of the greatest reasons for politicians to pursue a second job outside of the collection of a second pension is to increase the span of influence for a political machine. The most efficient fuel of political machines, and the simplest way for the machines to create new and easily controllable voters, is to tap into new immigrant populations that are more likely to need government support and naturalize them into the system. Immigrants have no initial expectations from the American political system that would decrease

---

<sup>8</sup> All the historic information in this chapter about the New Jersey Legislature was attained from the history of the NJ Legislature on the official website of the legislative branch of the state:

<http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/history.asp>



their vulnerability against machine leaders, but do have many needs, such as the need for patronage jobs or money from social programs. Moreover, by this comparatively recent history, machines had learned their lessons from the past. The earliest immigrant machines in America that had capitalized on immigration by extending their influence to help the new Americans had neglected to continue the process with the new crop of immigrants several years later. Erie explains: “having already fashioned a minimal winning electoral coalition among the earlier-arriving immigrants with the sturdiest of materials—jobs and money—the new machines turned their backs on later immigrants.” This opened the way for reform politicians to “[mobilize] the newcomers and [seize] on their discontent with the machine’s limited rewards” (Erie 1990, 69).

In the 1960s, New Jersey’s population was in the process of revitalization through immigration, and because of the great influx of new Americans into the state, political machines were healthy and strong on their own. Politicians could expand their influence through naturalization and count on the votes of the newest citizens and their children. In a system where political machines have a healthy amount of support from immigrants and have a large pool from which to naturalize and strengthen, there is a significantly small tendency for politicians to pursue second offices. They can control a city by generating new voters within the city or county limits, and because of the rapid rate of increase in population density they are more likely to establish a good rapport with their local legislator. This rapport can lead to a good amount of funding for social programs and projects, given that the increase in naturalized citizens and their socioeconomic

ascent provides evidence for the success of social programs funded by the state, and the growing population justifies creating new government bureaucracy. Thus the increases in the 1960s can be characterized as a side effect of the increase in total population of legislators rather than the impact of any individual factor within the communities that could trigger a rise in the practice.

Something similar can be said of the 1972 increase in multiple-office holding. In 1972, because of the extremely rapid rate of increase in population density, New Jersey finally mandated that its legislature be composed of representatives from special districts that were created with the intent of increasing the efficiency of representation and dividing the state appropriately by population (and also, of course, with the underhanded intent to gerrymander in a more efficient way). This resulted in an increase in multiple-office holders in general, but the rise in number is artificial because the overall number of legislators increased, as well.

The reasons for the gradual yet comparatively unimpressive increase in multiple-office holding in the 1970s and nearly stagnant activity in the 1980s to follow are manifold. In the next few pages, however, I will argue that a great contributor to this stagnation was the very reliable influx of immigrants that kept machines alive by buying their product. However, it is also worthy of note that during this time period, the machines or major political icons who would be inclined towards multiple-office holding in a future where it was necessary were particularly under attack from the federal government. Federal indictments in the 1970s left the political landscape a little barren for the type of activity in this

study, especially in areas where the practice tends to be most common.<sup>9</sup> Mayhew notes that in 1979, “as prosecutors closed in on Democratic party chairman Harry Lerner... a reform movement redesigned the structure of the county’s government [and] evidently cut off its patronage.” This event in Essex County, home to Newark and one of the largest bastions of multiple-office holding, left the political machine devoid of a major figure and replaced typical patronage methods of acquiring votes with issues, such as generic drugs and tenant rebates. To make political issues a priority instantly weakens any machine built upon patronage and naturalization (Mayhew 55).

The fact that, for the period spanning to 1989, the number of multiple-office holders seems to average out at a flat rate, seems to additionally corroborate the fact that the increase is of an alternate origin, since if it were a legitimate increase by percentage of the practice, it would probably demonstrate a more dramatic rise than that which occurred before the switch from counties to districts. This fits quite well into the theory that multiple-office holding is the result of a machine that is cornered by lack of immigrant supporters to expand its constituency to new potential supporters. The 1980s, which end in a similarly low note for the practice as they begin comparatively (despite the increase in representatives and the experimentation with districts that then began), also demonstrate this. The 1980s is one of the most dynamic decades in terms of immigration of the past century. According to a study by the Workforce New Jersey Public Information Network, “the majority of [New Jersey’s] foreign

---

<sup>9</sup> Places that have more or less affinity towards multiple-office holding within the state will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

population migrated to the state during the 1985-2000 period... the largest (22%) entered the United States during the 1985-1989 period” (Wu 1). And for key multiple-office holding areas like Hudson, Passaic, Essex, and Union Counties, a decent percentage of these immigrants, as well, emigrated from Latin America. While most of the refugees arriving from Cuba in 1980 via the Mariel boat lift stayed in Miami, New Jersey was the second most popular destination, and as the Cuban and Puerto Rican communities already settled in New Jersey created a safe environment for other immigrants who had not yet learned to speak English and were looking for an area in which they would not have to face issues of discrimination or merely inconvenience at not knowing the language. These immigrants, while more difficult to assimilate to American culture than the traditional Irish immigrants the local machines had accustomed themselves to over the late 19th and beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century due to the language barrier, eventually served just as well in developing and feeding the machines. As the 1980s were some of the most active years in terms of immigrant activity, it would follow that bosses would reap the benefits of having these immigrants as supporters, as well as the first generation of Americans born from them 20 years later, and thus not have to resort to multiple-office holding. A political climate in which immigrants are eager to participate in patronage and power maneuvers in order to reap the benefits of an interactive government is one in which the voracious machines do not need to extend their tentacles to feed, and thus is not a fertile climate for multiple-office holders, as discussed previously. Moreover, since the overall pool of great political father figures shrunk in the late 1970s due

to investigations by the federal authorities that led to the arrest of many of the greatest leaders of the period, the machine itself shrunk and needed less support all-around to survive. Political leaders had no real interest or necessity in taking more than one government job outside of the pensions, and even those, in many cases, were probably not worth the many trips to Trenton on a regular basis and the responsibilities of holding two elected offices.

### **Magnifying Multiple-Office Holding: 1988-2008**

Certainly the most active time in the history of multiple-office holding in the state legislature has been the years preceding the ban, where multiple-office holding appeared to be catching on across the state and the state's attitude towards politicians with questionable ethical activity became more favorable than it once was in the late 1970s when the federal authorities cleaned up the map. Thus, in order to continue with this study properly and address in the next chapter the issues regarding the time period in which this ban was implemented, we must take a closer look at the past twenty years of legislative history.




Figure 2 above shows the number of multiple-office holders in the entire state per year from 1988 to 2008. It was generated from Figure 1 and is not distinguishable from the years spanned here in Figure 1 in any way, but it does clarify many things about recent New Jersey history to have the opportunity to look solely at the last 20 years for information. Once again the definition of multiple-office holder is limited to those which hold an elected position in addition to the legislative seat, so appointed positions are not taken into consideration. No significant events are labeled on this chart because, after 1972, the number of legislators did not change in any dramatic fashion constitutionally, nor were there any occurrences that the researcher estimated would distort the validity of the fluctuations in multiple-office holders over time.

While on the whole a slight increase in legislators with a second public office has been witnessed over time, studying the past twenty years demonstrates

something counterintuitive to the original hypothesis<sup>10</sup> of this study: within the past decade the number of multiple-office holders increased in number dramatically. Between 2001 and 2002 the number in both chambers combined increased from 14 to 24 double-dippers, with the number remaining steadily above 20 until the partial ban in 2008.<sup>11</sup> Explaining this growth of multiple-office holding population in the legislature is imperative to this study, especially the jolt between 2001 and 2002. In terms of the broadest changes in the demographics of the state that affect this issue, of course immigration is sure to be one of the top players behind the change. According to the WNJPIN, the increase in foreign-born population in New Jersey was less than across the country during this time, despite New Jersey's percentage still being higher than the national average, both in foreign-born and in foreign stock (Wu 2008). Additionally, the individuals born of these foreigners who are first generation Americans are no longer disposed towards patronage in the favorable way they once were. The development of a new class of first-generation immigrant children twenty years after the 1980s stagnation in multiple-office holding creates an opportunity for multiple-office holding to appeal to constituents who are still not ready for an issues-centered

---

<sup>10</sup> Previous to having collected this information I had supposed that the ban came at the tail end of a decline in number of multiple-office holders, as a decline would render the practice obsolete and also empty the legislature of a sufficient majority with an interest in continuing to allow the practice.

<sup>11</sup> The *Star-Ledger* actually found the number of dual office holders in 2007 and 2008 to be somewhat different. They found that, using their measures, the number of multiple-office holders in the legislature increased from 17 to 19 between the two years (Schwaneberg 2008). However, this is because they did not include in their study positions that had the power of elected positions but were appointed, such as Chief Financial Officer or Police Chief. I included these positions because these individuals are often public figures deeply associated with the campaigns and, as such, as indirectly voted for.

campaign but have enough money to avoid the free turkeys at Thanksgiving. Couple this with some significant redistricting between 2001 and 2002 and the climate suddenly warms up toward multiple-office holding to expand the constituency to more people that need jobs.

There is another extremely important factor in this increase—the election of a multiple-office holder to the state’s highest executive office. James McGreevey, mayor of Woodbridge and state senator, was elected governor in 2001, and with his high approval ratings came a surge of multiple-office holders in the state legislature. He used his coattails to get his allies in power in the legislature (more on relationships between multiple-office holders in Chapter 5), and as such for the years he was in power maintained a high number of multiple-office holders in power, especially Democrats. The abrupt end of multiple-office holding, then, in the context of the executive branch, follows logically. As McGreevey lost control of his life and his office and spiraled into disgrace, Senator Jon Corzine began assembling allies, and eventually took over the office. The following chapter will go into more detail about the evidence for the power struggle between former McGreevey allies who are multiple-office holders and Corzine’s team, but the surge and sudden ban of multiple-office holding can be very much attributed to the rise and fall of Jim McGreevey.

### **Multiple-Office Holding Beyond Time: Party and Gender**

Statistics collected from the *New Jersey Legislative Manuals* regarding party and gender, while showing slight biases, do not lead very far. Post-ban the Democrats do have a fairly significant lead in both multiple-office holders and



overall number, but this is greatly exacerbated by developments both in local and national politics throughout the tenure of the Bush administration. Currently, the party breakdown in both chambers favors Democrats to Republicans 59% to 41%, with the multiple-office holder breakdown being 63% to 37% in favor of the Democrats.




Figure 3 above displays party breakdown in the NJ Legislature by party in percentages over the past two decades. Here it is clear that the number of multiple-office holders from each party is extremely dependent on the number of legislators from either party being elected, so that multiple-office holding is not a factor influencing the number of individuals per party in the legislature, but vice versa. Since party affiliation is a characteristic highly dependent on beliefs and

issues, it would follow that in multiple-office holding, a phenomenon deeply linked to political machines, issues would take a secondary, if any, position. Should there have been a correlation between multiple-office holding and party ID such that one party was guilty of the practice consistently more than the other, the number of Republicans holding dual offices would not have risen over that of the Democrats in times such as most of the 1990s, when Republicans were stronger on a national and state level thanks to the efforts of the national party with projects such as the Contract with America, etc. It should be noted, however, that the rise in Republican multiple-office holders seems to have preceded the Contract with America and the 1994 midterm elections, beginning in 1991 while George H.W. Bush was still president. This was also during Democrat James Florio's term as governor. The rise in Republican multiple-office holders, and Republicans in general, in the Assembly and Senate could be attributed, however, to unhappiness with the current executive government of the time, especially since Florio took office in between two of the most popular Republican governors of the state, Thomas Kean, Sr. and Christine Todd Whitman.

Moreover, even if the numbers would have been consistently more Democratic, there is no reason for a law banning multiple-office holding to be passed at a time when the Democrats were especially benefiting from the practice. While this does explain in part why many of the most vocal actors in the opposition against dual office holding are Republicans (Thomas Kean, Jr.; Joseph Kyrillos), it does not explain the reason for the law passing at all when so many Democrats have so much at stake in the legislature. Moreover, Corzine's attempts

at reducing the power of McGreevey allies put him at odds with his own party, such that the leader of the Democratic leader in the state was consistently in accord with Republicans. This type of dispute weakens party ID and cohesion such that it becomes less relevant. Additionally, this does not coincide with the view held by many Republicans who value the tradition of having someone deeply interested in municipal politics have a say on the state level and did not consider this opinion a desertion of the party.

Gender, as previously mentioned, appears to be an even less relevant factor in the issue. Women independent of how many offices they have are notably underrepresented in the NJ Legislature, with a grand total of seven female multiple-office holders serving in the legislature in the past two decades (four of them in the 2000s). There was also no specific correlation between gender and party ID as a factor for multiple-office holding together, as there simply has not been enough gender diversity in the history of the New Jersey Legislature for any study to provide valuable evidence.

### **CHAPTER 3: The NJ Multiple-Office Holding Ban as a 2008 Novelty**

The latter years of the first decade in the 21<sup>st</sup> century proved to be the most welcoming towards multiple-office holding for most—if not all—of New Jersey legislative history, and far and away the most welcoming for the post-1947 Constitutional history of the state. For most of the state’s history, legislators were elected from the counties and not legislative districts designed to represent more people and adapt to the immigration explosion that the state began to experience in the 1970s and continues to enjoy. This has quite predictably had an impact on that number. However, even taking into consideration this great change in the state’s history, the rise is unprecedented. Moreover, although this does not fit into the scope of our study, the increase in multiple-office holders in the state has been emulated in almost every aspect of local politics, mostly through freeholder positions, and most prominently in the urban counties.

Laws had threatened to end the practice since the days of the newest (1947) state constitution, yet had never materialized despite being often a topic of conversation when corruption was the topic at hand (O’Neill 2007, 6). What, then, was so special about that period in 2007 when the law finally ended the practice (sort of)? This next chapter proposes that the reason behind such a bill passing was a combination of the legislature succumbing to the threats of Governor Jon Corzine enacting another crippling government shutdown if they did not ban it and their own need to cash in on some political capital that was long overdue since the days of disgraced ex-governor Jim McGreevey (Schwaneberg). In the next few pages we will explore the law itself and the legislators both promoting

and opposing it, as well as the individuals that elected the people responsible for practicing and banning multiple-office holding and for electing Jon Corzine the governor, an individual staunchly in favor of the ban to the point of using blackmail to achieve it.

### **Multiple-Office Holding in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

The greatest number of multiple-office holders serving simultaneously in the New Jersey legislature, according to data I acquired from the NJ State Archives and the *Legislative Manual*, is 24. This number has occurred twice in NJ history: in 2002 and 2006. Beyond the research from the *Legislative Manuals*, this figure is corroborated by numbers from the Center for Public Integrity cited in O'Neill's *One to a Customer*, which declare that at least 20 legislators hold more than one elected office, and also cite that a third of the individuals in the legislature receive a salary from another government job, elected or otherwise (6). Due to retirements and a phase shift in the next year, this number dropped to 22 in 2007, still one of the highest in state history. After the ban, according to the calculations explained previously, only 14 multiple-office holders were left (this figure does not coincide with the one in the *Star-Ledger* article—they arrived at an increase from 17 to 19—but as they do not explain their metric for arriving at this number, for the purposes of this study I will continue to believe that the number declined). Of the Class of 2007 multiple-office holders, two were women (9%), five (23%) were of an ethnic minority, and two of the legislators (9%) were new to the legislature. None of these factors appear to have any significant impact on multiple-office holders or have any bearing on the significance and origin of

the phenomenon. Women in New Jersey politics are one of the more elusive types in the state's political configuration, and so gender in the state's political scene has never had the opportunity to evolve into a factor distinguishable from other due to simply to tiny sample size. Minority representatives are more prevalent but still have yet to demonstrate significantly different styles of governing, and as the legislature's minority officials come from all sorts of backgrounds—from African-American Ronald Rice (D-Essex) to Cuban-American Silverio Vega (D-Hudson) to Indian-American Uprenda Chivukula (D-Somerset)—generalizing their government styles appears a dangerous path to take. Moreover, in an argument that this study will explore more in-depth in Chapter 5, if multiple-office holding is a product of machines, which feed indiscriminately on immigrants and in their leadership also demonstrate no preference for any particular ethnic background, then there should be no impact on the practice by ethnicity. Bob Ingle, the Trenton bureau chief for Gannett newspapers and co-author of New Jersey corruption study *The Soprano State*, corroborated this claim in an online interview with me in December 2008. "Dual-office holding is an outgrowth of the machines," he explained, and he has not found any evidence indicating that politicians of any particular ethnic background are more prone to holding more than one office than others. "What matters," explains Ingle (and this study will grapple with this argument in the coming chapters), "is that they are team players and do the machine's work. In some areas there may be more of one group or another but that's probably because there are more of those people to begin with and would tend to control politics."

As for the composition of both chambers, 15 (68%) of the multiple-office holders held office in the Assembly, and 7 (32%) in the Senate.<sup>12</sup> The same breakdown occurs for party ID: 68% Democrats and 32% Republicans. The percentages divided by chamber are almost exactly the same as the percentage of each chamber that makes up the whole legislature (two thirds of the legislature is comprised of the assembly, while one third of it is comprised of 40 senators). The party ID delineations, however, are significantly skewed in favor of the Democrats. While the legislature is divided quite predictably 60-40 in favor of the Democrats on the whole, there is almost a 10% difference weighing the scale in favor of the Democrats when it comes to multiple-office holders. It still holds, however, that multiple-office holding has nothing to do with party when viewing years where the Republicans had control of the legislature. Take, for example, 1992: a year when a national shift to the left placed Bill Clinton in the country's highest office, and yet of the multiple-office holders serving in the NJ legislature, 60% were Republicans.

Within the 2006-2007 crop of multiple-office holders, most were incumbents that had been in office for only a short amount of time prior, usually just one term. Within this group of politicians there were, however, some important outliers, as most of the individuals that remain for a long time in the

---

<sup>12</sup> There are two main issues that may affect the much greater number of dual-office assemblymen than senators. The first is, of course, that the Assembly is a larger body, and thus a greater number of individuals could potentially fill the criteria for multiple-office holding in the Assembly than the Senate. The other issue is that the role of senator, due to it being an upper chamber and the number of individuals presiding in it being more minimal, is a job that requires a greater amount of time and dedication, thus leading towards more of these individuals to dedicate the entirety of their time to one position.

legislature tend to rise to important chairing positions and gain clout within the organization. Looking through the list of multiple-office holders there were definitely specific names that stood out as lasting presences in the political scene. Of these, Republican Leonard Connors perhaps stands the tallest. Connors is most notable for being the mayor of Surf City, NJ, a small coastal town on Long Beach Island that does not quite make one square mile and, as of the 2000 US Census, has a population of about 1,400. This position, which he has held since 1966 and continues to hold, he first held in conjunction with a position on the Ocean County Board of Chosen Freeholder in 1977. He later moved up to a position in the General Assembly, and most notably served as mayor and state senator from 1982 to 2008, when he retired from the Senate. Another significant character that continued to recur in the history books is Senator Robert Singer. Singer is currently the mayor of Lakewood Township, a much larger (+60,000 in population compared to Surf City) and diverse town, known as a Jewish-American enclave in the city and a popular resort for travelers looking for a summer retreat from New York City. Singer has been this town's mayor on-and-off since 1983, and has only experienced dual-office holding as a member of the legislature, initially as an assemblyman in 1986, and as a senator since 1993.

In contrast, the Democrats that stand out seem to have a much more extensive record of dual-office holding beyond the legislature. Take Senator Nicholas Sacco. In many ways, District 33 State Senator, North Bergen mayor, assistant superintendent of schools, and former elementary school principal Nicholas Sacco embodies the worst nightmares of the more genuine sponsors



(considering that former Newark mayor Sharpe James was responsible for bringing the bill to the state senate) of the multiple-office holding ban. His biographical sketch in the *New Jersey Legislative Manuals* modestly omits many of the titles he once simultaneously held or glosses over them, citing that the mayor has, for example, a “background in education.” Given his extremely pervasive presence in education, Sacco’s name and semblance is one that anyone who went to school in North Bergen in the 1990s (the researcher herself received her 8<sup>th</sup> grade diploma from the mayor) recalls fondly. With his Winter Festivals, Nights Out Against Crime, and myriad reading assemblies and children events, Sacco has developed the image of a shadier, slightly more malevolent Santa Claus to those who have grown up under his tenure.. Despite a very thorough effort vigorously chronicled by the *Bergen Record*, New Jersey’s US attorney Chris Christie has yet to pound on his door, though he has taken care of more than a few weeds in his backyard (Samson 2008). Around him have been swept into the depths of the corruption underworld individuals like Joseph Auriemma, a former top official in the city caught over-billing several municipal contracts to launder money used on improving his home in 2002 (Smothers 2008) and Peter Perez, a former commissioner of parks and recreation indicted for the same home improvement violations as Auriemma (Samson 2008).

Another prominent character to appear in this 2007 crop of legislators is Ronald Rice, a Democrat from Newark who has been in the State Senate since 1986 and has held various leadership roles and had several titles in city government, from City Councilman to deputy mayor. He is currently not a

multiple-office holder, since he gave up his deputy mayorship to run for the top job in the city (he has since lost to Cory Booker). While his sound defeat to the protagonist of an Academy Award-nominated documentary removed him from our topic at hand, his persistence on our yearly list of individuals which hold more than one office generates a mystique around him emulated only in those that have been around the legislature in more than one capacity long enough to comprehend the repercussions of this.

### **Double-Dipping and the “Republican” Opposition**

With 24 individuals in the New Jersey legislature reaping the benefits of dual offices, among them members with the star- and political power of Connors, Sacco, et al, a law passing that limited the scope of their influence when the practice was most common seems highly unlikely. Yet it is pertinent to keep in mind that, while 24 is still the highest number of multiple-office holders in recent New Jersey legislative history, it is still a small figure compared to the other 96 individuals in office that do not split their time between their hometowns and Trenton. And not all legislators are comfortable with the fact that others within the legislature practice this politics and, furthermore, create a clique within themselves of representatives that see legislating in a different light. Senator Sacco, for example, cited Mayor Connors as an unlikely ally, reaching across party lines because they both shared an understanding of local executive government. “We often tend to look at certain bills in ways different from other members,” he explains, “Lenny [Connors] helped me pass a bill I would never get

passed because of party, because he understood. Closing bars, stabbings, etc... the mayor on the committee understood.”<sup>13</sup>

The most prominent voice in favor of the ban is, contrary to the anticipated, not a Republican. Governor Jon Corzine had been pushing for quite some time for the legislature to ban the measure, and proved to have the most influence to force the bill through. Corzine had not publicly explained his objection to dual-office holding in any of the state’s larger media outlets particularly explicitly, citing only that “this issue of dual-office holding is one of serious concern for the public... I think it’s emblematic of conflict and incompatibility of making decisions that come from representing two different constituencies” (Guenther 2007). As for his actions on the matter, he had publicly stated that he was going to “push on” the matter, citing it as an issue that people were extremely interested in seeing discussed by their representatives (McNichol 2007). Corzine even threatened at one point that he “would have trouble” signing that year’s fiscal budget if within the new set of bills being proposed there were not one prohibiting dual-office holding (he later had to retract his demand for a complete ban and settle for the grandfather bill due to lack of support in the legislature) (McNichol 2007, Hluchan 2007, Smothers 2002). Unlike in most states, a threat from Governor Corzine to shut down the entire state government is not one to be taken lightly, as the legislature found out the hard way the summer

---

<sup>13</sup> The bill in discussion would close bars at an earlier date to decrease the number of violent crimes related to alcohol consumption in cities. Senator Sacco explained that the opposition to this bill rose to defend the bars as legitimate businesses with which the government should not interfere, but the mayors on the committee where he drafted the bill understood that, beyond freedom, this was a matter of safety.

before. In early July 2006, the governor signed an executive order that shut down most of the state's government, excluding essential components of it such as prisons and the state police. Among the "non-essential" bureaus affected by the shutdown were the Department of Motor Vehicles and state courts and the state's parks, beaches, and casinos (Jones 2006). This left about 45,000 of the state's employees unable to work, and cost the casinos—one of the major sources of government income thanks to the resort area in Atlantic City—\$2 million in government income per day that they were closed ("Casinos" 2006). The reason behind this unprecedented halt in the state government was a simple one: taxes. Corzine proposed increases in taxes on cigarettes, alcohol, luxury cars, and the sales tax. The latter became the crux issues in the government shutdown; 7% was simply too high for the legislature at that time (Chen 2006), especially given Corzine's reputation (Corzine raised taxes by almost \$2 billion in his first six months in office (Ingle 2008, 273)).

This rift between those legislators that held multiple offices and those that did not created quite a vocal opposition in the Republican party of the state, which at the time was the minority party and one that was not equally reaping the benefits of two titles. A tight-knit group of them went on a publicity tour once the bill was drafted and passed, awaiting the governor's signature, first and foremost among them Senator Thomas Kean, Jr.<sup>14</sup> of the 21<sup>st</sup> District, which consists of a substantial portion of Central Jersey including Essex, Union, Morris, and Somerset Counties. Kean criticized the bill that passed for having a provision

---

<sup>14</sup> Kean is the son of former Republican governor Thomas Kean, Sr.

allowing those that already were serving two terms to be grandfathered in, stating to the *Star-Ledger* that “it’s clear that half-measures don’t work.” He immediately began drafting a bill that completely forbade multiple-office holding, but it was not considered seriously by a legislature who had already discussed the situation and passed a bill so recently (Schwaneberg 2007). Senator Joseph Kyrillos, another Republican from the coastal 13<sup>th</sup> District, has also been a very vocal member of the fight against multiple-office holding. He has called the ban a “no-brainer” in the *New York Times* and, while not expressing the same type of outrage that Senator Kean has against the final version of the bill, has been equally vocal in the banning process. The same could be said of Assemblywoman Jennifer Beck of the 12<sup>th</sup> District, who gave several public statements on the matter in a similar vein of those fellow Republicans Kean and Kyrillos gave, having drafted a complete ban, without a grandfather clause, on the practice, but it was never considered by her colleagues. She later attacked one of the softer bills proposed against it, claiming that she did “not congratulate [those in favor of the bill] on [their] abandonment of principles” (Pizarro “Senate” 2007). Other significant voices in the passing of the bill include Senate President Richard Codey, Assemblyman Gary Chiusano (R-Sussex), Senator Kevin O’Toole (R-Essex), and, outside of the legislature, political science professor at Rutgers Alan Rosenthal (Smothers 2008, Schwaneberg 2008, Pizarro “Senate” 2007). Of course, in addition to these voices, Senators Ellen Karcher and Sharpe James, both Democrats of the 12<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> Districts, respectively (and James the mayor of Newark at the time), and Assemblywoman Linda Greenstein of the 14<sup>th</sup>

district—the sponsors of the bill in their respective chambers—had a very important hand in the passing, if not a prominent place in the state’s media.

### **The 2007 Political Forecast: Cloudy with a Chance of Subpoenas**

Despite now having an idea of who the protagonists in this saga were at the time and how many and how vocal the multiple-office holders of 2007 were, we still cannot explain just what caused the politicians that opposed the practice to unite and pass a bill at this time as opposed to any other, given how perennial of an issue multiple-office holding has been in New Jersey history. The reasoning behind the strength of the argument against it very much stems from the political climate in which officials relatively new to the office, Jon Corzine being foremost among these, were thrust.

A year may have passed between the law’s passing and the establishment of a new executive government, but New Jersey was still reeling from the destructive departure of Governor James McGreevey, who had left in ignominy on November 15, 2005 proclaiming that his homosexuality had prevented him from finishing his term. In a way, it was, since his affair with his Israeli Homeland Security Advisor (salary: \$110,000), Golan Cipel, was the straw that broke the camel’s back with regard to the outrageous corruption within his administration (Ingle 45), not so much because they had engaged in what McGreevey called a “consensual homosexual affair” in his final press conference as governor (McGreevey 2004), but because the six-figure administrator of one of the most important positions in state government had nothing in his resume that “would cause any rational person to think he was a terrorism expert” (Ingle 2008,

45). Beyond that, there was little reason to believe that McGreevey had resigned exclusively because of his recent discovery regarding his sexual orientation. Several mysterious expenses on the government's tab already had the federal authorities swarming around his administration trying to find proof of illegal activity, much of it relating to travel. For example, McGreevey claimed to have spent around \$20,000 on a "trade mission" to Ireland. In reality, the governor ended up spending at least \$105,000 on telephone fees and a large-scale family reunion (Ingle 2008, 48). Moreover, the former mayor of Woodbridge and State Senator (simultaneously!) had surrounded himself with a crew of fundraisers that many rumor led to his demise way before anyone knew about his relationship with Cipel. First and foremost among these was Charles Kushner, the leader of a "billion-dollar real estate empire" (Horowitz 2004) and major campaign contributor to McGreevey's campaign. Around the same time that McGreevey faced his resignation, Kushner was charged with witness tampering, obstruction of justice, and promoting prostitution for an attempted at weakening the testimonies of his sister and brother-in-law against his companies. More specifically, Kushner had paid a prostitute \$10,000 to seduce his brother-in-law and record the affair on tape. He sent his sister the tape just before a family party (Horowitz 2004; Ingle 2008, 51).

It may be speculated that this type of scandal is the reason for Jon Corzine's sweeping win in the 2006 elections despite running within the same party that McGreevey had emerged from—he seemed to have enough money not to need to be corrupt, especially considering that McGreevey was neither the first

nor the last to be convicted of corruption in the court of public opinion (if not by state officials). Yet the levels of comfort with Corzine were not exactly stable at the time. According to a poll recently released by Quinnipiac University spanning most of Corzine's tenure puts his approval ratings at 35% in April 2005, and maintain them around those numbers until a one-year period in which Corzine established himself passed, leaving him with 51% approval rating the month before the multiple-office holding ban passed (Richards 5).

Thus the reasons for Corzine to support a ban on dual-office holding are two-fold: on the one hand, he entered the office suffering in popularity due to the corruption of others surrounding the office previously, and thus needed to find a way to superficially deal with the issue of corruption without implicating himself or his position. As he himself held two extremely powerful offices in the state and his approval certainly did hinge upon the fact that many people saw him as an insider with a decent amount of money, clarifying his name by vigorously promoting anti-corruption laws that were of a bipartisan appeal was a healthy option for his career at the time. On the other hand, preventing legislators from accumulating power, especially when it amounted to double constituencies and resources to communicate with them, appears to greatly benefit the executive branch, not solely because it weakens the checks on it, but also because it affects approval ratings. Limiting legislative power rarely lacks support from people (remember the well-known axiom that the masses always love their congressman but hate Congress). Around the time that Corzine's approval was at 35%, the legislature suffered from a 20% approval rating, according to the same study.



Over the next two years, its highest approval rating was 41% in January 2005 (Richards 5). This way, Corzine takes care of two birds with one stone: he weakens potential rivals by taking away their privileges from a second office and curries the favor of a public that is rarely inclined to support the legislature over the executive.

As for the legislature, Corzine partially blackmailed them into agreeing to the ban by threatening to shut down the state yet again, but for many in the minority party who were not multiple-office holders, limiting the power of others in the legislature that potentially voted against their bills while appearing to their constituency as capable of bipartisanship, there was nothing but political capital to gain.

### **The Law of the Land: Results**

Given the powers at play in the reshuffling of multiple-office holding powers, the law that actually came of all this seems a reasonable conclusion with which to end the chronological study of the demise of multiple-office holding in New Jersey. The version of the bill that passed through the New Jersey legislature was sponsored, as previously mentioned, by Assemblywoman Linda Greenstein, and initially lists the offices that one cannot hold simultaneously: most major federal offices, state legislative offices, county clerk, register, surrogate, or sheriff. It later states explicitly: “No person shall hold at the same time more than one elective public office in this State or a political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” Most curiously, however, this version of the bill states that “This act shall take effect on January 8, 2008, and any elected official holding more than

one elective public office on that effective date shall resign from all but one office.” The Senate version of the bill, sponsored by Senator Ellen Karcher (R-12) and Newark Mayor Sharpe James (D-29), directly opposes this section of the Assembly bill, stating: “a person who, on the effective date... holds simultaneously an elective county office and an elective municipal office may continue to hold the elective offices simultaneously if service in those elective offices is continuous following the effective date.” As we now know, this provision was maintained in the final document and is the only major difference between the Assembly’s draft and the final product.

The conclusion that this study achieves through researching the setting for this bill and the powers that surrounded its birth is that the grandfather law came about because of increased animosity towards the law from state senators, who are individually more powerful and often have longer histories of multiple-office holding. This is, of course, in addition to the aforementioned theory that the explosion of corruption followed the resignation of Governor McGreevey created an atmosphere such that it was advantageous for Corzine to support such a bill and goad the legislature into passing it. For example, an article describing the deliberations on the bill in the Senate describes the opposition from Newark Senator Ronald Rice as “infuriated.” ““I’ve been here 21 years and I’m tired of hearing that dual office holding is conflicting,” he declared to the Senate. In the end, however, only two senators voted in opposition to the bill—Senator Robert Martin, a Republican close to retirement, and Senator Nicholas Sacco, who seemed genuinely perplexed at Corzine’s staunch intent to remove multiple-office holding from New Jersey political culture. Sacco, Max Pizarro from Politicker NJ duly notes, need not worry about tainting his reputation with a constituency that

elected him with an 80% in his last mayoral election ( “Senate Passes” 2007). Many of those dual-office holders that were less confident in their ability to get reelected no matter what became a quiet voice of dissidence within the legislature, such as Union City Mayor and Assemblyman Brian Stack and West New York Mayor and Assemblyman Silverio Vega. Stack, citing that “it makes [him] a better legislator to know local government,” abstained from voting on the bill. Vega, who voted against the bill, also cited that he did not take any issue with an individual holding more than one public office (Pizarro “GOP” 2007).

In investigating the individuals working in favor or against laws that ban multiple-office holding, it has probably become clear that distinguishing why multiple-office holding has taken such a prominent place in New Jersey politics and why it was precisely in 2008 that this law passed are difficult questions to answer. Furthermore, searching for the answers exclusively on the basis of party affiliation has not clarified every significant aspect of this phenomenon; after all, it was Corzine who had to push his own Democrats in the legislature to pass the bill. To better understand how these bills were crafted and passed and, on a deeper level, where this multiple-office holding tradition stems from, it is important to resist the temptation to view New Jersey as a politically homogenous unit. In an interview for this study, Gannett Trenton Bureau Chief Bob Ingle stated that he believed “New Jersey is so small geographically, it doesn’t seem to make a difference. Camden County and Essex County and Bergen County have machines. But so does more rural Ocean and Burlington.” Thus Ingle reintroduces a concept that had little import in our chronological study of multiple-office holding: the

machine. To comprehend the role of the machine in multiple-office holding and flesh out the argument that Corzine needed to push to pass the bill in an attempt to combat open “machine politics,” it must be noted that Ingle could not have been more incorrect in his assumption. If time is but half the story, then place—where multiple-office holders get their wings, so to speak—is the other side of this political coin.

PART 2: A Geographical Survey of Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey  
**CHAPTER 4: Mapping Out Multiple-Office Holding**

In the past two chapters we have been able to experience the evolution of multiple-office holding through time in the state and arrived at various conclusions: party identification, gender, ethnic background, and chamber of the legislature in which multiple-office holders exist seem to have very little impact on their numbers and governing styles. The number of multiple-office holders in the Legislature had been swelling steadily across time even taking into consideration the adoption of a new state constitution and the increasing number of representatives until state legislative districts were adopted. The new millennium—the years before the ban—saw a spike in the number of multiple-office holders with the rise of mayor of Woodbridge and state senator for the 19<sup>th</sup> District Jim McGreevey to the state's highest office, and an eventual termination of the practice by a law passed under Jon Corzine, the former US Senator who eventually replaced McGreevey and launched a campaign to restore legitimacy to the governor's office.

Thus a great deal of the understanding of multiple-office holding and its demise in New Jersey that we now have is related to its place in New Jersey history and the political climate of the time. Since the aforementioned data demonstrated a negligible if any relationship between multiple-office holding and gender, race or party, this narrows our list of possible factors involved in the development of multiple-office holding and leaves us with a very suspicious-looking culprit: geography. This, however, leaves many unanswered questions, especially when trying to analyze what kind of politicians are more likely to hold

simultaneous offices and what kind of socioeconomic and local political situations would make it more likely for voters to identify and feel comfortable with a leader with several hats, so to speak. I propose to dedicate the following two chapters to the relationship between local political cultures within New Jersey and the number and type of dual office holders in the legislature over time. Before any argument can be made on who arrives at these titles and how they get there, however, an analysis must be made of New Jersey state geography in relation to multiple-office holding. First I will show data from the *New Jersey Legislative Manuals* over time as they pertain to the geographic distribution of multiple-office holders in the state and demonstrate that multiple-office holding is much more likely to occur in areas where the population density is higher, more individuals live under the poverty line, the percentage of foreign-born and first-generation immigrants is higher, and there is an established tradition of political machines. As discussed in the introduction, multiple-office holding and the study thereof is very deeply linked to the development of political machines, as it occurs only in New Jersey at these exorbitant rates, a state whose politics is studied most to understand the development of political machines in urban communities. In proving this I intend to make a more thorough point on the individuals running for these offices: mostly, but not entirely, powerful local politicians who need the second job to expand their constituencies and gain benefits to distribute as patronage to their most loyal subjects. While the issue of pensions is an important one that the anti-multiple-office holding GOP lobby poses as one of its favorites, I will argue that this is a secondary issue to the expansion of constituencies and

appreciation distributed to loyalists. The issue of patronage also explains why New Jersey, despite having the greatest number of individuals who hold at least two public jobs simultaneously, also has the greatest number of overall government jobs, 81 government workers per square mile, as opposed to the national average of 6 (Ingle 2007, 5). To confirm what was previously established as per the entire state in Chapter 3, I will also demonstrate that the distribution of multiple-office holders across party lines per county is on a similar, if not identical, level to that of legislators as a whole, and thus multiple-office holding being skewed to one party or another is merely a consequence of the popularity of one party over another in any given time. This will allow the study to continue in the next chapter to how the distribution of dual office holders per county affected the legislature such that the ban on multiple-office holding occurred during the Corzine era.

### **District Evaluations: 1988-2008**

In my interview with Bob Ingle in December 2008, Gannett Trenton bureau chief, he gave us two main overarching arguments that were the impetus for the following evaluations. First, multiple-office holding is exclusively a product of the expansion of political machines across a state: “people who aren’t connected don’t get [the positions].” Machine bosses needed to expand their influence across greater constituencies, and thus accumulated more titles. While this argument does align somewhat with this study’s conclusion that the need to become a multiple-office holder is a product of the desire to expand the constituency, the conclusion that this is exclusively a product of machines

excludes many multiple-office holders who can be considered machine bosses but hold positions within parties instead of public positions (i.e. former NJ Democratic Party Chairman Raymond Lesniak (D-Union)) and those who hold dual positions who show no signs of being involved in something that could be remotely labeled an urban political machine (i.e. Mayor Leonard Connors (R-Ocean)).

The other observation Mr. Ingle made to us via email regarding the power of machine politicians in multiple offices is that the issue is uniform across almost all possible variables. Taking machines and multiple-office holders to be different facets of the same phenomenon, he explained: “I have found no connection between machines and their ethnic, religion [sic], or racial background. What matters is that they are team players and do the machine’s work.” Beyond this, he elaborated. “New Jersey is so small geographically, it doesn’t seem to make a difference. Camden County and Essex County and Bergen County have machines. But so do more rural Ocean and Burlington.”



Before tackling the issue of the indelible relationship between machines and multiple-office holding, it is important to take a look at the distribution of multiple-office holders across the state. In order to have a reasonable estimate of the recent distribution of them over time, I have created the following map using data from the 1988-2008 editions of the *New Jersey Legislative Manual*. Since the number of multiple-office holders has remained constant in the past 20 years, I did not find it necessary to go by percentages but, rather, by pure number of individuals who participate in this practice. The number variations among




different districts are also reliably on similar scales because each district has had the same number of opportunities to elect multiple-office holders. The darker regions represent areas where there have been a greater number of multiple-office holders in the past 20 years. In putting together these numbers, I chose to count individuals multiple times that appeared in different years, so that someone that had been around all 20 years would count 20 times. I did this because I believed it would counteract the bias inherent in the map with the fact that only up to three individuals can be multiple-office holders per district at a time. As you can see, the map seems to immediately demonstrate that multiple-office holding is not at all a statewide issue. Most of northwestern New Jersey and the southern tip seem to have little going on in that realm. What's more, it appears that the northeastern area close to New York City and some areas in the south are the biggest culprits. The darkest area, District 30, includes the part of Mercer County that Trenton is located in.

Trying to find a similar state pattern with which to compare the geographic composition, I juxtaposed a map showing population density of the state to the multiple-office holder map previously discussed on the previous page as well. The data was taken from the 2000 Census as this is the closest we could get to the middle of the time span (1988-2008) with which we are interested. This would thus be the closest to an average of population density given that the population of New Jersey is consistently on the rise with little acceleration. The comparison based on visual impression alone demonstrates an undeniable relationship between multiple-office holding and population density. Bergen,


MULTIPLE-OFFICE  
HOLDING 1988-2008



Source: U.S. Census Bureau  
Census 2000 Summary file 1  
population by census tract.



Multiple-Office  
Holders in NJ by  
County  
1988-2008



Essex, and Hudson Counties (Districts numbered in the late 20s- 30s) are strongly represented with multiple-office holders. These are also the state's most densely populated areas, as well as the nation's (as per the 2000 US Census, Union City, NJ, at the heart of Hudson County, is the most densely populated city in the nation. It is followed by three of its neighbors: Guttenberg, West New York, and North Bergen). The Trenton area and Central Jersey also stand out as the 30<sup>th</sup> District. These areas are all moderate-to-extreme in population density, with Camden County as perhaps the greatest exception of a fairly densely populated area with relatively few multiple-office holders. There also appears to be a pocket of low density in the 20<sup>th</sup> District that is both surrounded by high-population areas and experiences a moderately high level of multiple-office holding.

There are several natural discrepancies to consider when evaluating the number of multiple-office holders by congressional district. For one, as mentioned previously, the maximum number of multiple-office holders in one district at any given time is always three, two in the Assembly and one in the Senate. This caps the number of potential office-holders in such a way that areas with a culture that would be more likely to accept this in this and other realms would be underrepresented. Additionally, areas that are linked by county, Congressional district, general political culture or population density are not adequately represented. Some areas where it would be feasible to have more than this number of dual office holders are capped by the district. Alternatively, areas where multiple-office holding isn't common but are linked by district to areas that are open to this seem to be more involved in this practice than they really are. For

example, District 30 is the darkest region in New Jersey according to our map, yet outside of Trenton it appears that population density is quite low. This is because individuals keep being elected from the Trenton area that already have offices there are taint the numbers for other areas of Mercer, Monmouth, and Burlington Counties. In order to diffuse these issues somewhat more, in the third figure presented on Page 5 the same data is restructured by county rather than by Congressional district. While, on the one hand, counties are larger areas than districts, because of the nature of Freeholder titles and because many divisions span and combine counties that have similar political cultures, it is clearer to see in this image a more accurate representation of multiple-office holders across the state. On a statewide scale the county map matches the population map much more than the district map. Two significant factors to attribute to the increased accuracy and legitimacy of the county map to the district map regard the nature of the district themselves. The reason the state is divided into representative districts to begin with as opposed to the way it was done in the past (simply by county) is to assure more equal representation. Districts are divided into sections of relatively equal populations. This severely dilutes the usefulness of a map with equally populated subdivisions if population itself was a factor being taken into consideration. Furthermore, the prospect of gerrymandering the districts tampers with the legitimacy of the study, whether the gerrymandering occurred for the sake of party support or, more likely in a diverse state like New Jersey, in order to create districts more likely to elect minority members.

Thus it is clear that the map divided by county would coincide more accurately with the map divided by district, as the three images on Page 66 demonstrate. It also becomes increasingly clear that multiple-office holding is not completely a statewide issue. District 3, for example, when divided into Gloucester, Salem, Cumberland, and a tiny sliver of Camden County, appears almost completely devoid of multiple-office holding, to the increase in number of Camden County. It is also noticeably on the low end of the population scale, excepting the areas close to Camden County. The Essex-Hudson-Bergen power block of multiple-office holding, which is also the most densely populated area in America, is shown as the epicenter of the state's multiple-office holding culture. The larger districts in that area by land also seem to have less multiple-office holding than the smaller ones, in large part probably due to this population issue. District 30 is also extremely diluted among Monmouth, Burlington, Ocean, and Mercer counties.

### **Defining the Urban: Foreign-Born and Poverty-Stricken Population**

Categorizing multiple-office holding as a majority-urban phenomenon requires defining urban sectors as something beyond areas with high population density, as the amount of people with which one is surrounded has little to no effect on the political landscape as an isolated factor. Other factors that define how most political scientists conceive of the concept of urban living must also come into play. In a place as culturally diverse as New Jersey, taking a look at the percentage of individuals that were born outside of the United States is a good way to measure the tight-knit ethnic communities. In this study we will also look


at the number of individuals under the poverty line<sup>15</sup> in any given region. Poverty and the inner city have rarely been mutually exclusive issues, although, as we will encounter shortly, New Jersey is more of an urban state by its populous nature and proximity to major Northeastern capitals, and often some of the most poverty-stricken communities in New Jersey can be found in the more rural sections. However, it is very important to take into consideration the amount of people that are needy and thus more vulnerable to government schemes that could involve machine politics, patronage, and, at least indirectly, multiple-office holding. To balance out this discrepancy, we will also look at the foreign-born population, which have traditionally migrated to the more urban communities by nature of the need for unskilled labor there. What's more, if multiple-office holding really is, as Bob Ingle has argued, a product of machine politics, there must be a substantial immigrant population in play to manipulate and feed into the machine, especially if one is to believe in the standard machine of the area as depicted by Steven Erie et al in machine politics studies (see Chapter 1). New Jersey is also a spectacularly immigrant-friendly state. According to a study by the New Jersey State Office of Labor Planning and Analysis, "the total number of foreign-born persons increased 25 percent in New Jersey from 967,000 in 1990 to 1,208,000 in 2000...only four other states – California, New York, Florida and Texas had more foreign-born persons than New Jersey" (Wu 2008, 1).

---

<sup>15</sup> The definition of "poverty" as per the US Census Bureau's website: "Following the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB's) Directive 14, the Census Bureau's Poverty Definition uses a set of money income thresholds that vary by family size and composition to detect who is poor. If a family's total income is less than the family's threshold, then that family, and every individual in it, is considered poor."

On the following page is a table with the respective percentage of foreign-born individuals per county and the percentage of individuals per county below the poverty line, organized in order of number of foreign-born individuals as both categories did seem to often coincide, and yet the disparities among counties in number of foreign-born individuals is significantly higher and is visually more comfortable to experience.<sup>16</sup> The findings highlight a few issues with defining urbanization that blur lines (income vs. expenditure evaluation of poverty, for example), but overall corroborate the results of the multiple-office studies above.

**Percentage of Foreign-Born and Poverty-Stricken Individuals in NJ, 2000**



<sup>16</sup> Since the US Census data available is already divided by county, I did not consider it necessary to find the information divided by legislative district, especially since these districts already pose a somewhat biased evaluation of the distribution of multiple-office holders.

Consulting the population of foreign-born individuals per county, it is abundantly clear that the pattern witnessed previously regarding population density and multiple-office holding also translates into the realm of foreign-born population. Hudson County, with 40.4% of individuals born abroad, comes in first place of both percentage of foreign-born residents in the population and number of multiple-office holders in the past 20 years (remember that studies have proven most foreign-born residents came into New Jersey after 1985). Bergen and Passaic Counties are the two runner-ups in the competition both in multiple-office holding and in number of foreign-born citizens, with Essex County lagging a bit behind Middlesex County, a county of a slightly smaller size in population density that makes up for that aspect of its nature (although mostly suburban but fairly populated) with its high number of residents born abroad. On the lower end of the spectrum are the usual suspects: Cape May and Salem Counties- places that rarely put a blip on our multiple-office holding radar, also have a very low percentage of individuals born abroad.

For the most part, it appears that the percentage of individuals living below the poverty line in any given county can also be an indicator of a higher probability of multiple-office holding politicians establishing a base there, but the statistics are less certain. There is evidence that poverty levels do interact with other statistics in way that are beneficial to our study. For example, being of a minority status in New Jersey greatly increases your probability of being below the poverty line. According to a study by the Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute in December 2008, “the experience of poverty for



Hispanics and African-Americans is three times the rate experienced by Whites” (LSN 2008, 36). The above chart demonstrates that, with regard to multiple-office holding, this is mostly true. For example, Hudson, Passaic, and Essex counties all have comparatively high rates of poverty as well as a great number of foreign-born individuals, and are all among the most welcoming counties to multiple-office holders. On the other side of the spectrum, Hunterdon, Morris, Warren, and Gloucester all have some of the lowest rates of poverty in the state and demonstrate little tolerance for multiple-office holding, especially in the past two decades.

The county dealing with the largest percentage of individuals below the poverty line, Cumberland County at 16%, stands nearly alone in defiance of the multiple-office holding trend. Cumberland, comprised of three cities, ten townships, and one borough and hours away from any major city, is not exactly what one would call “urban”. According to its tourist-attracting website (“Cumberland County- More to Offer!” 2008), Cumberland’s claim to fame is being the “Oyster Capital of the World” in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. In other words, Cumberland County isn’t exactly a burgeoning metropolis, nor did it rank anywhere near the top of the multiple-office holding ladder. Yet it tops the list of poverty-stricken counties in America. This is in large part due to the fact that, in New Jersey, most of the more urban areas, especially the ones near the greater New York area, are quite expensive to live in, such that most people born and raised in the more suburban or urban communities of working class people in the state find little opportunity to leave, unless they can find an inexpensive place in a

dangerous part of Newark or Camden. Thus, despite a small population and probably, judging by sheer population alone, not any major threats of crime or other inner-city problem, there are a number of areas in New Jersey that have a high number of individuals experiencing poverty in as close to a rural setting as New Jersey can offer. Most of these places are coastal retreats with little industry, such as Cumberland or Cape May Counties, although not all of them (i.e. Salem County) need to be on the shore. Moreover, many places where the number of individuals under the poverty line is high have a smaller job market which results in a higher number of unemployed individuals, something that, in a patronage-laden multiple-office holding district, is not common. Multiple-office holders, especially those that adhere to the tenets of machine politics, are a strong contributing factor to the fact that New Jersey has 81 government workers per square mile. Thus, poverty as an independent factor seems to have little relation to multiple-office holding, though it does appear that, in an urban setting where the issues of poverty become inextricably linked with those of minority issues and problems that can easily be solved with patronage, poverty can be a salient issues.

#### **District 9 and Atlantic County: A Statewide Anomaly**

In the entire examination of this geographic data, District 9, which corresponds to most of Ocean and some of Atlantic County, has been the elephant in the room. On both maps it appears extremely friendly to multiple-office holding, and as District 9 constitutes quite a large section of South Jersey it has the potential to tip the scale between the practice being a regional one rather than an issue relating to the entire state. Atlantic, the culprit county that makes District

9 (and thus a large part of Ocean County that otherwise does not appear to be so favorable to the practice recently) look like such a core for the practice, also appears unusually tainted, but not to the extent of areas that are undeniably so. It is nowhere near the core region of multiple-office holding, but that would be forgivable if it weren't for the other factors taken into consideration regarding urban areas—foreign-born population and number of individuals under the poverty line—and the blatant way that Atlantic County seems not to conform to this standard. With a 15% population of individuals born abroad, the area does have a slightly higher percentage than the national average, but significantly lower than most of the regions with the highest number of multiple-office holders. In the poverty division, since most of Atlantic County is coastal tourist spots that are profitable in the summer and rarely have a thriving job market in the winter, the numbers are slightly higher than most of the wealthy areas in New Jersey (Bergen, Morris, Somerset Counties), but still only at 13%- not very close to the numbers for Hudson, Passaic, and Essex Counties. Atlantic County, in other words, seems a bit too average to have the number of multiple-office holders it does. Yet Atlantic County has a treasure none of the other coastal counties have: Atlantic City. Atlantic City, a city of 40,000 famous for its tourist-attracting boardwalk and its long stretch of casinos and event venues across the coastline, does not host the kind of metropolitan area that some towns outside of New York or Philadelphia are capable of simply because of its placement far from almost every significant city in or around New Jersey, yet has the kind of urban statistic that would make Atlantic County as a whole relevant to the discussion on

multiple-office holding. 26.1% of the population, as of 2007 estimates by the US Census, are foreign-born, and 22.5% of individuals living there are experiencing poverty. If Atlantic City itself were a county, it would rank higher than Essex County with number of foreign-born individuals and be the number one most poverty-stricken county in New Jersey. It has some significant potential to alter the statistics, despite the rest of the county not being particularly urban as defined above.

It should also be noted that the greatest number of multiple-office holders in the past 20 years from Atlantic County are not actually from Atlantic City, although a good number of them are. A logistical issue in the organization of the data exacerbates the influence of each individual multiple-office holder. To organize the information regarding multiple-office holding per county, I collected the names of every multiple-office holder in every district for twenty years, using the definition of multiple-office holding delineated previously. Since every legislature, just like the US Congress, has its own number and is considered a separate entry every year, I considered it appropriate to repeat names. So one multiple-office holder can multiply at most 20 times (one for each year studied).

While District 9 does have some multiple-office holders, the reason it appears particularly so is because of one individual, former State Senator Leonard Connors. Connors, which has served for more than 30 years as the mayor of Surf City, NJ, and agreed to speak with us on his 20+ year tenure in both that position and the state senate, was in the state senate for the duration of the time frame with which we are working with the exception of the year 2008, when he stepped down

from his legislative seat in order to wind down and focus on being mayor. Thus it appears that Connors counts for 18 different multiple-office holders, which counterbalance those individuals in the rough Northeastern politics that are lucky to last more than their two-year term without a corruption scandal. Thus it appears that the tiny Surf City is one of the major focal points for multiple-office holding which, despite it being only one person elected, the fact that Connors was able to maintain himself in that position for 18 years and not rile up any significant contenders does make a strong case for the area being in support of public officials that hold more than one office.

As discussed in the past several pages, despite the claims by many that multiple-office holding is an issue that affects everyone in the state and is a native flaw of New Jersey as a whole, studying the background of most of the recent leaders that hold more than one office demonstrates that most of the state, at least geographically, has little problem with the matter. Moreover, taking a look at the social composition of their geographic backgrounds proves that the issue stretches beyond certain areas rising up but, rather, that urban areas seem to have a more favorable disposition towards multiple-office holding as a whole.

As we will see in the next chapter, the individuals that are voted into office from areas which are safe havens for multiple-office holding tend to also approach legislative issues in different ways from those that are elected from areas more politically conventional compared to the rest of the nation. This is especially true when the legislation in discussion pertains specifically to multiple-office holding itself. It is easy to vote against multiple-office holding as a

representative from Hunterdon or Cumberland Counties, where the issue has little to no affect on citizens but voting to abolish it certainly looks good on a resume. To vote against it as a Hudson County politician with five jobs is a much different story. Corzine, a native Chicagoan, also has little experience in areas where multiple-office holding is the norm, and has the background necessary to perhaps perceive the practice as a statewide phenomenon.

## **CHAPTER 5: The Legislature Goes to War**

In Chapter 3, it was previously discussed that the atmosphere in 2007 was ripe for a multiple-office holding ban because of several factions in the state government at play: Jon Corzine and his desire and mandate to undo most of the damage incurred from the McGreevey administration, a strong Republican lobby lead by State Senator Tom Kean, Jr. opposing the multiple-office holding practice because of “ethical” reasons, and a minority of multiple-office holders that were retiring from at least one position, mostly due to retirement age in itself but exploited by the press as acts of selflessness before the people. Studying multiple-office holding in this manner, however, excludes a major factor from being in play here: the fact that New Jersey is politically fragmented in such a way that different parts of the state are more or less accepting of multiple-office holding, and these trends have persisted over a significant amount of time.

As discussed in the previous chapter, New Jersey is not at all politically homogenous, especially within the context of multiple-office holding. In fact, most areas in New Jersey are not particularly favorable to the practice, especially the larger and less populous counties. Most of the multiple-office holding going on in New Jersey is concentrated into urban areas: the Hudson-Bergen-Essex urban triumvirate, some areas by Camden and Trenton, Passaic, and Atlantic Counties. However, this is where most New Jerseyans reside. If it is true that attitudes towards multiple-office holding as expressed through elections vary across the state, it should also follow that we are to expect these patterns to be reflected in the representatives these people elect to higher offices. Thus, the arguments in

Chapter 4 that the reason for the multiple-office holding ban passing in 2007-2008 and not before is incomplete without taking into consideration the regional attitudes at play in the construction of this law. Of course the statewide factors: the Corzine/McGreevey rivalry, the Republican desire to constrict Democratic power in a solidly blue state, etc., are extremely salient in comprehending what went on in the New Jersey Legislature at the time. However, this is only one part of the story. To explain the behaviors of many of these representatives that were either in support or opposition to the practice, it is imperative to look at their regional background.

The political atmosphere surrounding the May 2007 ban was not a particularly clean or honest one, so as to create a domino ethics reform effect against multiple-office holding despite its rapid increase in popularity. It is true that some multiple-office holders at the time were facing significant trouble; however, the overall influence against the practice pushed to the contrary. The legislature only began to face significant outside pressure to reform later that year. In July 2007, US Attorney for the state of New Jersey Christopher Christie went on an arresting spree, taking what he called in the *New York Times* a “corruption tour” that ended with several arrests and indictments, including that of Newark Mayor and state senator Sharpe James (Feuer 2007, Chen 2007). If there had been pressure from the Eliot Spitzer-esque federal attorney towards reform since his appointment in 2001, it could only be interpreted as a self-aggrandizing ploy, like most things in this state. Christie announced in December 2008 that he could be interested in running for governor of the state after years of speculation



(Reitmeyer 2009). Certainly the influence of such an overtly ambitious political character would not be enough to push the law. Even if Christie, with the aid of current governor Jon Corzine's push for reform, were to convince a significant amount of lawmakers to push for change, loopholes in the law to ensure that the legislature is more representative of a larger and diverse group of people, without any regard for the informal machine structures that thrive on a practice, simply do not compute.

In this chapter I propose to highlight that dimension of the multiple-office holding ban that erupted from regional trends in the matter—that is to say, the factors regarding regional attitudes towards multiple-office holding that lead to the necessary amount of legislators that would make it possible to pass this law. I will give a detailed account of what was going on in New Jersey at the time, beginning with the state senator elections in the 33<sup>rd</sup> District (Hudson County) as my main case study examining the state of multiple-office holders as a group at the time. I will argue that, while in places like Hudson County, multiple-office holding was widely accepted, and McGreevey's influence did help, him being from Middlesex County and all, Corzine's influence coupled with the strength of the Republican Central Jersey lobby made it possible to pass a law in which the only thing that multiple-office holders could do was join the movement in order to save themselves in order to sacrifice others, which is why Newark mayor Sharpe James also sponsored this law. These factors accumulated against multiple-office holding because, in itself, the practice strongly benefits those who adhere to it, but it is usually at the expense of neighboring cities that lack the strength of double

representation. Looking at the after-effects of the 2007 33<sup>rd</sup> District state senate elections, for example, it is clear that there are many instances where places represented by candidates that are unable to win elections for more than one office are forced into a subsidiary position to the mayoral seat of the person in legislative power.

Additionally, it is necessary to look at individual cases of multiple-office holding that can clarify the intentions and attitudes of legislators from within. On paper, finding a common denominator among the multiple-office holders may not always be the simplest task to complete. However, as a collection of public servants with one specific preference in governing, they do seem to enjoy similar habitats. Despite the fact that their populations are higher and thus they should have more politicians among them to accommodate, urban politicians—particularly those in the three urban sectors of the northeast and the outskirts of Trenton—tend to prefer holding more than one job. A significant factor contributing to this could be the fact that, despite the higher gross number of individuals, more are living below the poverty line (3% above the national average in Hudson County, 2% in Essex). Moreover, a dividing factor between these regions and others in New Jersey where the rate of multiple-office holders is low along with family or individual income is the percentage of foreign-born or non-citizen residents. Hudson, Essex, Bergen, and Passaic counties all have at least twice the national average of foreign-born citizens, with an average of 42% of households in the four counties speaking a language other than English at home (Hudson County tops this list with 56% of families being multilingual). In terms

of citizenship status, this translates into an average of 50% of residents in the four counties not being US citizens, and thus neither being able to vote nor run for office. The narrowing of the possible public servant pool could very well be a contributing factor to the number of individuals in these areas who are willing to take up several jobs, machine politics aside.<sup>17</sup>

While these macro-factors are quite useful in understanding the mechanisms that drive this practice as a localized trend, it answers little questions as to the fiber that makes up individuals willing to engage several jobs simultaneously. Additionally, given the make-up of both chambers of the legislature and the enormous pressure on the legislature from Governor Jon Corzine in 2007 to pass the ban on the practice, many multiple-office holders did vote in favor of the ban, including a decent amount from the usually suspect areas. Governor Corzine, who himself was polite enough to the state to give up his senate seat before taking the highest executive office in New Jersey, blackmailed legislators by refusing to sign property tax relief bills in 2007 unless a majority of the legislature voted in favor of the multiple-office holding ban, which polls by the *Bergen Record* show about 80% of citizens being in favor of (“Hold that Pen” 2007). For State Senators that may not have an interest in maintaining a machine with public officers serving in various positions, the choice to ban the practice may be sensible. It definitely puts the legislator in a positive anti-corruption light for a short term before everyone forgets that it was even possible to hold more than one elected office. However, given the chance to defend their positions, it is

---

<sup>17</sup> All the aforementioned statistics courtesy of the US Census Factfinder, and are compiled from the 2005-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates.

worth investigating what individuals who hold multiple offices have to say for themselves and what positive outcomes they can cite from having more than one position.

### **The Multiple-Office Holding Kings of Hudson County**

Union City, NJ, the introductory case in this study, is arguably the most multiple-office holder friendly city in the state. Following the trends recording in Chapter 5, it makes sense that the most densely populated city in America (52,977.8 individuals per square mile according to the 2000 US Census) would also be the home of 5 distinct legislative multiple-office holders in the past 20 years as per the *NJ Legislative Manuals*—that is to say, a constant stream of multiple-office holders elected to the New Jersey Legislature for 20 years, rather than one stand-out individual taking two jobs for that amount of time. It also makes sense that this would be the home of longer-reigning and more powerful multiple-office holders, such as former mayor Robert Menendez, who serves in two offices for six years and is now the most powerful Latino in the US Senate and arguably in the nation.

I begin the study of the 2007 political climate here because this is the strongest base for this kind of activity, and in order for the system to crumble it follows that the foundations must have been somewhat weaker. Yet Union City in 2007 appeared perfectly comfortable with its multiple-office holding captain, Mayor and State Assemblyman Brian P. Stack. Stack's history with the city has brought him into such a comfortable position with voters that there was a time, in 2003, where he held three jobs: mayor, state assemblyman, and freeholder for the

county (“Hudson County” 2003). Beginning his career at 17, Stack made a name for himself in the late 1980s and early 1990s doing community service and working in local activism. In Union City, much like in the Jersey City of Frank Hague or the New York of Boss Tweed, “advocacy” and “community service” mostly translates to one thing: turkeys. The distribution of free turkeys for Christmas and Thanksgiving were major issues in the New York and New Jersey traditionally considered machine-ridden, and it was with turkeys and toys that Stack made a name for himself. A *Hudson Reporter* profile of the mayor from 2005 states with pride that Stack’s civic association gives away an average of 12,000 turkeys and 15,000 toys a year (Amato 2005).

Stack also made a name for himself for his uncanny ability to be warm and personal with anyone he met, a necessary trait for a politician. Silvio Acosta, a subordinate campaign manager for Stack’s unsuccessful mayoral run in 1998 and Cuban exile activist in the county who gave the researcher some anecdotes on local politics is fond of telling a story of an Indian-American voter who passionately supported Stack. “We were canvassing door-to-door for Brian,” he explained in Spanish, “and when the man opens the door and we say the name ‘Brian Stack,’ the man tells us: ‘Brian Stack is the only person in my entire life who has ever sent me a card on my birthday. He is the only person that cares, and I will never fail to vote for him.’”

These kind of personal relationships are, of course, straight out of the traditional machine playbook. In describing the Democratic machine as it has manifested itself throughout most of American political history, Frank Robinson

states in his study *Machine Politics*: “[the machine] would pay a bill for you if you were strapped for cash, deliver coal and food, Christmas and Thanksgiving turkeys... the neighborhood politician knew you personally by name, and greeted you enthusiastically as a friend. He often seemed the only man in the great impersonal metropolis genuinely concerned about you and your welfare” (Robinson 1976, 3). This is precisely the attitude that Stack employed in his 1998 elections, which he lost against state legislator Raul “Rudy Garcia and the Alliance machine lead by then-Congressman Bob Menendez (Edge 2009) and what got him to the top position after a bitter recall election after which Garcia was deemed unfit to govern.

Union City’s closest (culturally and geographically) neighbor, West New York, had a slightly different breed of political climate in 2007. After being under the administration of now US Congressman Albio Sires from 1995 to 2006, the city required a new crop of politicians to come up and rearrange themselves so as to fix the mess that Jon Corzine’s staff reorganizing began. Sires was appointed to replace Robert Menendez in the US House of Representatives after Menendez moved up to the Senate to replace Corzine, leaving a void in the top office of West New York. Chosen to replace Sires as mayor was Commissioner Silverio (“Sal”) Vega. As a commissioner, Vega had already begun his political career as multiple-office holder, employed as the longest-serving chairman of the Hudson County Board of Chosen Freeholders and also working with the Hudson County Schools of Technology board of education and as a state assemblyman. Unlike Stack, however, Vega did not begin his career with politics on his mind, nor did

he have time to develop a real individual political personality. Having emigrated from the small town of Cárdenas, Cuba as a child, Vega had the predictable hurdles of immigration to overcome before even thinking of having a political career. Vega's early life is marked by his education—a Bachelor of Science from the University of Tennessee in physical education. He was a track star and a teacher, a far cry from the lifelong politicians surrounding him. However, despite his higher education compared to Stack, the latter holds a key check against him: all the years Vega was out of state, Stack was walking the streets as a civil activist, making a name for himself. What's more, when assuming the position of mayor, Vega had not yet proven that he was capable of a political victory on his own. While the experience from the aforementioned jobs made him a trustworthy candidate, all his victories, including the mayor's seat that he did not win in an election, were a product of his affiliation with a machine and not with the people. He entered the mayor's office with almost no mandate from the people, leaving him in a vulnerable but definitely fixable position.

### **The 2007 State Senate Election Heats Up**

The year 2007 began with wide speculation on the future of Brian Stack's career. Given his ascent against a powerful machine and establishment as a formidable political force in and of himself, the campaign for the next powerful office on the ladder seemed set: Stack would run against incumbent Bernard Kenny for the state senate seat. Kenny, however, sensing this danger, stepped down and opened the way for Stack rather than being demolished by standing in his way (Edge 2007). Kenny himself was never an overwhelmingly popular

political figure—West New York political fixture Silvio Acosta once wrote an article on the state senator in local newsletter *The Political Reporter* called “The Incognito Senator,” a basic narrative describing the process Acosta went through in the search for Kenny’s state senate office. He could never find any contact information, nor anyone in the three most popular coffee stops in the city that knew who Kenny was.

Given the near-complete lack of Republican opposition in the region, this meant that Stack was practically guaranteed the senate seat in the upcoming elections. There was no real open opposition to Stack running among the Democrats either, and first and foremost among his supporters in January of that year was Sal Vega, who gave a speech in his behalf (the raw footage is not available, but the Stack campaign later used it in an attack ad (“Believe” 2007)).

It did not take long before Vega decided that peace was not the best alternative to the situation. As early as February 7<sup>th</sup>, reports began to surface of conflict between Vega and his predecessor Albio Sires as Vega chose to fire several key members of the Sires administration and replace them with loyalists of Anthony DeFino: Sires once-great political nemesis. Vega also began to turn on his peers in the State Assembly in a manner that one assemblyman described as “shooting his mouth off”. While he was still allied with Stack at this time, it took little for Vega to take the complete plunge (“Menendez v. Garcia” 2007). Vega launched his campaign on April 4<sup>th</sup>, 2007 in one of the most surreal political turnarounds in mainstream political history—but probably one of the more average ones for Hudson County (“Vega Itching” 2007). Citing rumors



circulating that Stack was vaguely corrupt and some arrests made on government employees in Union City, Vega set off in his dinky Freedom Wagon across Union City itself attempting convert people to his cause. While Politicker NJ later described the Freedom Wagon (think the John McCain campaign bus meets Ron Paul blimp) as a “luxurious, gas-guzzling RV [that] gives Vega the appearance of a bewildered mid-western tourist in search of the Turnpike on the back-roads of Union City,” (“Vega Profile” 2007), Vega managed to pique the interest of main Hudson County machine the Hudson County Democratic Organization which, looking to put a stop to Stack’s increasing stranglehold in the region, decided to support Vega. Stack, on the other hand, put together a makeshift organization of his own, Democrats for Hudson County, which functioned nearly exclusively as a banner with which to get the team names on the ballot. At the height of the multiple-office holding frenzy and just as the bill to ban the practice was being written by the state legislature, these two mayors put all on the line for a precious second (in Vega’s case, third) job.

Stack’s campaign began in classic Stack style. Putting the Brian P. Stack Civic Association into overdrive to help any- and everyone in need, Stack maintained a mostly positive image in the face of a barrage of negative attacks. Among the stronger points Stack emphasized was funding for a new high school in Union City and further funding for public housing. In other words, Brian Stack made clear that he was a master of bringing home the bacon. On the other hand, Vega made the fatal error of making the entire campaign about Brian Stack. Websites with clearly smearing names like StackScandal.com (now a private

blog) complimented the vicious attacks from the HCDO camp accusing Stack's administration of embezzling money and creating government jobs as favors to loyal benefactors ("Shocking News" 2007). Stack retaliated with "Believe," which exploited the speech Vega gave in his favor the January before. As the jabs intensified, Vega, under pressure from various Cuban-American groups in favor of Stack, thus made perhaps the biggest mistake of his career.

Union City, West New York, Guttenberg, and North Bergen share one of the largest commercial avenues in Hudson County: Bergenline Avenue, home to a colorful collection of ethnic stores, restaurants and similar establishments. As both Union City and West New York share the second-largest Cuban-American population in America outside of Miami, one of the biggest events of the year is the Cuban Independence Day Parade that travels up Bergenline Ave. At the height of Parade fever, Vega, a Cuban-American himself, refused to give the organization in charge of the parade a permit for entering West New York, the largest and most significant piece of parade real estate. The reasoning is best summarized by Jonathan Miller's evaluation in the *New York Times*: according to Vega, "over the years the parade had lost sight of the suffering in Cuba, and he wanted nothing to do with such a spectacle. 'The truth is, no one is talking about the plight of the Cuban people,' Mr. Vega said in a news conference on Monday" (Miller). In other words, celebrating Cuban Independence Day was a slap in the face to the millions on the island that suffer from a rigid totalitarian regime. To Vega loyalists, many of which overlap with the portion of the West New York population that is still rabidly anti-Castro, the message of solidarity rang true.

However, for many others, especially those involved with the parade on a long-term basis, the ban was perceived as racist and disrespectful to one of the most significant ethnic communities in the district. Moreover, the fact that there was a heated election in the midst of this stunt did not go unnoticed by most voters. The leaders of the parade, noted allies of the Stack campaign, were noticeably dismayed and came to a predictably political conclusion. According to the *NYT* piece, founder and chief executive of the Cuban Day Parade Emilio del Valle had no doubt in his mind that the prohibition of the parade was an attempt to silence the voice of his opposition's support. "He doesn't want to walk next to the mayor of Union City through his own town... because he knows he will be booed and his opponent will be cheered. He has converted this to a political issue, and he won't admit that'" (Miller 23 May 2007). This point of view was further corroborated by Vega's past attitude towards the parade. This was the first year that Vega appeared so passionately against communism (as represented by the parade). In fact, many opponents of Vega's crackdown on the festivities turned to photographic evidence of Vega supporting and enjoying himself at the parade in previous years.<sup>18</sup>

If the intention behind blocking the parade was to quiet down the Stack supporters and garner the support of the Cuban-American community in the area, the plan could not have backfired more. About a week before the election, a New Jersey Supreme Court judge ruled against Vega's ban on the parade, which would have cut three of the four cities involved in it from the event (Miller 31 May

---

<sup>18</sup> See Appendix C for image of Stack, Vega and Congressman Albio Sires (then West New York Mayor) at the 2005 Cuban Day Parade.

2007). Vega respected the decision of the court, but ordered the West New York section of Bergenline Avenue to be decorated in black ribbons to honor those suffering on the island.

The voters did not understand or appreciate the gesture. The parade incident became the deathblow to the already fledgling Vega campaign. The final vote tally put Stack 44% ahead of Vega's tally, winning 77% of the vote in the district and winning Vega's hometown (Friedman 2007). While the meaning of this in terms of the cities themselves is up for debate, in this story is certainly highlighted a certain appreciation for multiple-office holding that only this region of New Jersey could provide, and quite a compelling reason for many that oppose multiple-office holding for the government interfering in these affairs. Since the voters had a choice between two multiple-office holders, evaluating their attitude in general towards the practice is somewhat more difficult. State Senator Stack, while holding two jobs proudly, is not exactly a vocal activist for multiple-office holding. Upon attempting to contact him, we were unable to schedule an interview, and records demonstrate that Stack is not incredibly vocal in defending the practice (he abstained from voting for or against the ban while an Assemblyman). Vega, however, has gone out of his way to defend his three jobs. According to PolitickerNJ (by far the most concise and trustworthy source of recent New Jersey political information), when asked about his three jobs (now two since he has evacuated the Assembly), Vega answered "My father worker in a factory, a restaurant, and sold jewelry on the side. He was a triple dipper, too. That's where I learned it." ("Sal Vega" 2007).

The Hudson County story is significant because it highlights the fragmentation of the core group supporting multiple-office holding at the time. If they start fighting among themselves, there will be less of them elected to higher offices to defend the practice. Yet it is also important to highlight the people still left around to vote against the ban and the places from which they come. In the next segment I propose to study two multiple-office holders from very different places and their relationship with the legislature, the municipal government, and each other.

### **Sacco and Connors: Multiple-Office Holding on Both Sides of the Spectrum**

Nicholas Sacco has always attempted to push the envelope. Beginning his career in education, at his peak multiple-office holding activity, Sacco was the mayor of North Bergen, NJ, the 32<sup>nd</sup> District's state senator, an Assistant Superintendent of Schools in the City, and an elementary school principal. He has also always held ties to county government and worked closely with the Hudson County Democratic Organization. Once again, this is exemplary of Hudson County politics in particular, though North Bergen is more socioeconomically akin to southern portions of Bergen County.

Coming from this sort of a world, it's no surprise that Sacco's first comment on the Corzine corruption spree that helped passed the ban on multiple-office holding would be "I wonder what planet he's from" when agreeing to answer some of our questions via telephone from his office in North Bergen Town Hall. Sacco expressed what appeared to be genuine bewilderment that such a law would pass. "The legislature can run wild with some very high ideals," he

answered when asked how he believed such a law could pass when multiple-office holders abounded as they did. “Legislators are much more removed from the people. People don’t know what they do, but everyone knows what the mayor is doing.” The level of accountability of a mayor, he argues, is significantly higher than that of legislator because of the nature of an executive office. Other legislators, such as the aforementioned wild card from South Jersey Leonard Connors<sup>19</sup> (R-Surf City) agree, particularly in the latter’s case because Surf City is a much tinier town than North Bergen. Surf City is a coastal town on Long Beach Island, a thin strip of land that garnishes the hip of New Jersey. It’s population is barely existent and its main political issues, as explained by Connors, tended towards the fishing, crabbing, and clamming industries and what to do with the city in winter<sup>20</sup>.

In a place like Surf City, Connors argues, everyone knows each other, especially as visible a personality as the chief executive, and so the responsibility deepens to a much more personal level than it would be otherwise. While Sacco admits that in such a populated place as North Bergen, the level at which this occurs is less so, he states that he still feels a pressure that is foreign to legislators because of the size of their constituency and the little visibility their responsibilities get in the media and in residents’ daily lives.

---

<sup>19</sup> Connors’ biographical information, rather than being placed directly after the longer Sacco information, I hope to place in an earlier chapter where I talk about the history of multiple-office holding in general, rather than in recent memory.

<sup>20</sup> Surf City was the setting of the beginning of German director Wim Wenders’ film *Alice in die Städten* (*Alice in the Cities*).

What does that heightened responsibility translate to? A more active public servant, argue both mayors despite their party identification. For Sacco, he viewed holding two offices as a personal mission to regain for his city and his county—Hudson often being the corruption laughingstock of the state—the respect he felt it deserved. As a mayor, he often felt slighted by the legislators in charge of his district when demanding what his residents needed, knowledge he would otherwise not have had with the executive position. “[In 1994] we were receiving no respect county-wide as a city, and I went to the state senator saying I had someone [to appoint as a judge], and he had to listen to a mayor of a city of 15,000.” His suggestion was completely ignored. Meanwhile, the legislator in question had voted in favor of a seemingly innocuous bill allocating funding to residences for drug-addicted citizens who needed a place to stay. “What happened in North Bergen,” he explained in his rendition of the crisp, fragmented, fast-paced vernacular typical of the area, “there was an intense fight on 70-something Street<sup>21</sup>, one of the most expensive areas, for the mentally ill drug addicts. The people in that neighborhood absolutely erupted.” Area residents, concerned about crime and property value, were outraged that the state legislator didn’t take into consideration the area in which the residences for these individuals was to be built. According to Sacco, when approaching the state legislator, “this person had

---

<sup>21</sup> North Bergen is culturally divided into two sub-sections: uptown and downtown. Uptown is considered wealthier and more residential with higher populations of non-Hispanic whites. Downtown is more commercialized, urban, poor, and Hispanic. Both areas are divided by the presence of a large chunk of Union City in between them. “Downtown” spans the area between 1<sup>st</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Streets; “Uptown” begins around 70<sup>th</sup> Street and ends on the Bergen County line. This information derived from visits to North Bergen, personal observation, and interviews with residents.

voted for the bill and didn't want to hear about it." Being removed from the city and stuck in Trenton, Sacco argues, rendered the state legislator useless to the citizens of his district. This made him believe in the power of multiple-office holding and convinced him to run.

While the specific issues that plague urban centers like North Bergen do seem to lend themselves to multiple-office holding better, thus making the areas fertile ground for the practice, Connors agrees that his experience as mayor helped him serve in the legislature. "Most of the time it helped me to be mayor and understand local government... many of these legislators don't understand the problems local officials go through with budgeting, etc." As similar an example given the vastly different areas that Sacco and Connors reign over from the coastal area involved protection of the environment. Just as the legislature voted for something that sounded on paper to be in good faith to help drug-addicted residents in North Bergen, the Environmental Protection Agency entered some coastal areas and confiscated land. In Little Egg Harbor Township, an area almost 20 miles south of Surf City with very similar demographics, government, resources, and culture, the government confiscated a man's land, about 20 acres of it, in the name of environmental protection. "They didn't let him build a home on his land," Connors explained, "because the EPA had designated the land to be protected area of the Pinelands<sup>22</sup>." Not listening to or understanding the territorial boundaries and demands of citizens is one of the key faults, argue both mayors, of

---

<sup>22</sup> "The Pinelands National Reserve includes portions of seven southern New Jersey counties, and encompasses over one-million acres of farms, forests and wetlands. It contains 56 communities, from hamlets to suburbs, with over 700,000 permanent residents." (National Park Service, US Dept. of Interior 2009).



single-office legislators who have no real knowledge of the happenings on the ground in their district.

Where there are more people competing to own more pieces of land, and where the government often tries to enact laws regarding land that will affect more people living on it, it would logically follow that there would be a higher demand for a more personable, approachable legislator, someone who knows the ins and outs of the area better than anyone else—someone who has an office that will give them all the information they need to legislate. The way in which Sacco and Connors, among others, describe some of the individual benefits to districts that have multiple-office holders certainly fits into the geographic composition of the state based on these offices. They do not, however, lend much information regarding the reasoning behind Corzine and legislators like Senator Tom Kean and others, mostly Republicans that consider the position of having two offices a conflict of interest that is severely detrimental to the state. Sure, there is something to be said about being the neighboring town of a city with a mayor as well as a state senator.

Perhaps the most poignant example of what a neighboring town could suffer in the hands of a state legislator who is the chief executive of another town is also in Hudson County. The increasingly acrimonious relationship between West New York's Sal Vega and the district's state senator and Union City Mayor Brian P. Stack, as chronicled previously, seems to finally be taking a significant toll on the town. While Vega and Stack announced a truce several months after they both ran for the state senate seat after Vega had endorsed Stack the January

before the primary election (Friedman Dec 2007), the situation in West New York has not seen any significant improvement. Violence in schools has risen while funding for roads and social programs is on a decline, and the city's financial situation is in dire straits, with several tax increases, a several-billion-dollar deficit that did not exist prior to Vega's inauguration, and several hearings on the budget proving fruitless (Staab 2009). Meanwhile, Union City has almost completed construction on a new high school and the *Hudson Reporter* is replete with letters of praise for the mayor. It is a valid argument that the state of affairs in West New York has much to do with the state senator not allocating the city funds as payback to Vega for betraying him (Vega, who was on the ballot as the candidate for the Hudson County Democratic Organization team, also represented the mainstream Democratic "machine" of which Sacco is a major leader). Others will argue that outside influences, such as the recent lawsuit filed by West New York's Chief Financial Officer Darren Mahoney against Mayor Vega for sexual harassment, have distracted significantly from the mayor's ability to govern ("WNY Official Files Sex Suit" 2009).

Unfortunately, I spoke to Mayor Sacco several weeks before Vega was charged with the harassment suit and thus was unable to ask about the issue, although in attempts to discuss the matter with Sacco he opted to return to discussing his experience in the state senate (the researcher suspects the change in subject has much to do with Vega's and Sacco's positions in the HCDO, which, to reiterate Sacco's objections, is "not a machine". It is left up to the reader to decide how trustworthy this assertion is). In discussing how he decided to run for the

state senate because of the fact that North Bergen “didn’t get any respect” in the county, however, he did state that this lack of respect could possibly be at the benefit of other cities around him. At the time he ran, US Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) was serving in a nearby senate seat as Union City mayor, and the mayors of Bayonne and West New York were also involved in legislative state politics. “I knew what the problem was,” he explained, when his town was not reaping the benefits of being represented on a state level that it deserved. “I had a fight to pass through legislation to help North Bergen instead of other cities that were similar.” He cited specifically Union City and Bayonne as the main adversaries, despite the fact that neither of these were in the same district, but to a representative like, say, Leonard Connors, it is easy to neglect distinguishing between most of the cities in the northeast, apart from places like Jersey City and Newark.

Thus we can see that the lobby and arguments in favor of multiple-office holding are often strong, but that geographically and politically 2007 was an unstable time for multiple-office holders. The strength of the arguments made by individuals like Sacco or Connors was undermined by the bloody political warfare going on between other multiple-office holders in the area. For hard-line GOPers desperately looking for anything to make their play and weaken the northern Democrats significantly, the activity of which the Vega/Stack fight was exemplary is heaven-sent and, when combined with evidence of corruption from the McGreevey era and the backing of a Democratic governor in this effort, and the deviation of characters like Sharpe James in order to save their own jobs, the

motives and organization with which multiple-office holding was banned becomes significantly more vivid. Not only is the competition among multiple-office holders a dangerous issue in general, but among those of the same district, especially if that region is stigmatized as one where multiple-office holding is rampant, it lends credibility to the right-wing (and Corzine) argument that multiple-office holding is inherently conflicted, if because of Byzantine politics alone.

## **CHAPTER 6: The Democratic Upsides of Dual Office Holding**

For many scholars that have spent their careers attempting to chart and comprehend trends in the macro-structure of human political interaction, the previous information could perhaps have been extremely daunting. It appears that a great number of individuals in academia spend their lives studying large-scale national politics or interactions among nations; to see that municipal politics and interactions among towns and cities presents a similar if not more difficult puzzle may weaken the nerve of some exploring these types of studies. However, the progress in a field that many take for granted as simple should not have such an effect on the entire community. There is little reason to feel daunted by the expansive nature of local politics. Part of the apprehension may come from the fact that local politics, since it is not by its nature uniform, is a mostly unknown phenomenon. Especially in New Jersey, where scholars are faced with strange configurations such as Boards of Chosen Freeholders and Commissioner boards and governments that appear nowhere else in the world, it may seem best to ignore the matter and move on to issues which may be simpler to grasp given what is mostly considered universal knowledge of American politics. Often, and especially in the beginning of the assembly of this study where so few precedents had been set in the study of multiple-office holding, it appeared as if the macro-political world was the only significant one, and yet as soon as a political scientist paid attention to the micro-political in ways beyond anthropology and the vague attempts at defining “social capital” that pervade academia the entire system flickered under the new pressure. Of course, the main reason for the pervasiveness in American political studies of national issues is that most scholars would

consider national trends and the study of federal government more relevant to more people in the nation. Everyone, the belief goes, is affected by the federal government's actions. Going into a forgotten region of the United States and examining how politicians act when Big Brother turns his back can seem inherently more difficult and more useless. However, a major theme that this study ventures to convey is that individuals are *more* affected by their local governments than the federal one. The fact that most people are affected in similar ways by the federal government does not erase the fact that local politics, especially in areas that are multiple-office holder friendly, is a much more powerful influence in their daily lives. It is the mayor that hands out free turkeys on Thanksgiving, gives away free government housing, or files their taxes. It is the state that gives funding for paving the roads they take to work every day and maintain the schools in which their children learn. However, the decentralization makes finding patterns infinitely more difficult, and beyond that, useless in studying the impact of these governments. All we can do as scholars, just as we do with large nations, is make comparative studies. Engaging with the topic of multiple-office holding in one of the most unique political climates in the nation, then, does appear to be self-indulgent in a way that will benefit few people, as a small number of the people living in America can relate to New Jersey politics and the very specific niche multiple-office holders inhabit. Self-indulgent, perhaps, but studying these trends is infinitely useful in terms of understanding how to make other local governments better. By examining the traits of a specific political climate molded by decades of eccentric government structures,

immigration, and hyper-population density, scholars can find the positive traits of the smaller case and attempt to mold other governments such that these benefits arise. The reverse with the negative aspects of New Jersey's political situation is also true.

I have decided to dedicate the final pages of this work to a more value-based evaluation of multiple-office holding itself. The main goal of this work was to explore the reasons this practice arose in New Jersey and especially the reasons for the state government opposing and finally partially banning it in 2007, when we later learned the practice was increasingly popular. Nowhere previously have I intended to defend or condemn the practice. After a quick recapitulation of the results of my study, however, I intend to give myself the freedom to express some conclusions I have arrived at with regard to the benefits and detriments of the practice. Multiple-office holding can be an extremely positive force in legislatures especially (though in other government realms, too) because it increases accountability by increasing and empowering the constituency as well as giving individuals that are more closely acquainted with the needs of their constituencies a say in state government. Mayors are especially well equipped to understand the demands of the constituency, and to give them a voice in the state government gives someone very closely linked to the needs of the community the tools they need to draft legislation and pass laws that the community which they serve very much needs. To elaborate on my points more specifically, I will argue against the points made by Tom O'Neill in his work *One to a Customer: The Democratic Downsides of Dual Office Holding*. O'Neill's work is the premier piece of

literature on multiple-office holding in New Jersey and quite possibly the only academic study on the matter out there previous to this piece. In *One to a Customer*, O'Neill dedicates his chapters to eight main detriments of having a multiple-office holder in control of his jobs. Each one of these shall be debunked herein.

### **Corzine, McGreevey, and Urbanization in Multiple-Office Holding**

To reiterate, this piece has asked two main questions of the current political situation in New Jersey: what kind of political environment creates acceptance among individuals of public servants that work more than one job, and what setting did the New Jersey Legislature find itself in during the 2007 ban on the practice? The latter question has a much easier answer than the former. After a disastrous tenure in the governor's mansion by a well-known multiple-office holder who supported a network of equally- employed public servants, the legislature was ready to reclaim what little positive reputation they could find in the state. At the very least, this is the cleanest answer. The McGreevey administration was a failure for many reasons beyond the Golan Cipel fiasco; taxes skyrocketed, the state's education systems faltered, and the governor was often found anywhere but his Trenton office. However, it was the unimaginable number of enemies that McGreevey made while in office that did him in. Evidence from *The Soprano State* and state news at the time (c. 2005) point out that McGreevey had many these enemies through all sorts of decisions, including but not limited to \$105,000 taxpayer-funded "trade mission" voyages to Ireland (in reality family reunions- Ingle 48), his association with known political fiend



Chuck Schumer, and his appointment of famous poet (“If there was poetry... we can’t find [it]”: Ingle 60) Golan Cipel. Among those enemies, of course, Senator Jon Corzine, who later took over after McGreevey completed his own demise. In the Corzine/McGreevey power struggle that ensued it became increasingly clear that the suspicions held in the hypothesis of this work and corroborated by State Senator Nicholas Sacco et al were true. McGreevey took care of his own, and many multiple-office holders in the legislature had unabashedly supported him. Multiple-office holders, as Sen. Sacco explained to us in Chapter 5, tend to form political bonds with each other because they have similar understandings of municipal and state government, understandings that they often do not share with single-office holders. The ban, a chunk of political capital waiting to be cashed in that the government had been keeping for a rainy day, became an easily accessible way to check the power of multiple-office holders, who were more likely than single-office holders to have supported McGreevey.

The grandfather clause had a bit more to do with the geographic fragmentation of multiple-office holders than any particular point in time. The clause was the most precise way the multiple-office holders could deal with the issue and keep their jobs without losing favorability among their constituents, especially in places where they were most abundant, i.e., Hudson, Bergen, and Essex counties. As one of the biggest groups of multiple-office holders ever assembled in the legislature, they wielded significant influence—enough to make sure a complete ban did not pass. On the one hand, making sure the ban did not pass would give individual legislators a negative image among their constituency.

This is the reason why individuals like Brian Stack et al abstained from the vote. On the other, being part of the movement to ban multiple-office holding would cost them at least one of their jobs, and the fact that Corzine was backing the effort made it particularly insidious for Democrats to oppose it, just as Tom Kean's influence tainted Republicans against the effort. The compromise was to get one of their own involved in the drafting of the bill—namely, Newark Mayor Sharpe James in the State Senate—and at the very least secure their own jobs. Thus both sides have arrived at a precarious compromise that almost everyone agrees is mutually detrimental. For those that oppose multiple-office holding, the grandfather clause guarantees it for at least another 30-40 years. For those that support it, it prevents up-and-coming leaders from gaining a second office and joining the veterans.

Explaining trends over time and place presents to us a much more difficult puzzle than the reasoning behind any singular event in state history, and as such organizing the trends of multiple-office holding across the state over time can be much more daunting than explaining why the ban occurred when it did. Before this study, to my knowledge no one had compiled a database of multiple-office holders over time in the state (the database used here was collected from biographical sketches and newspaper articles). Thus the biggest hurdle in studying the history of multiple-office holding in New Jersey was the lack of interest by other scholars that would lead to compiling data in useful ways before the study. After organizing the data in an easily digestible manner, it became apparent that there was indeed a pattern developed over the recent history of the state: urban

areas with high population density and often high concentrations of immigrant populations were more favorable to multiple-office holding than places that did not experience this. In contrast, upper class, ethnically homogenous, and scarcely populated communities have adopted, for the most part, a completely different and less engaged political culture where the incentives to hold more than one office are lacking.

With this batch of information, it becomes much simpler to achieve the goal of coming to some concrete conclusions on the matter. For one, it is safe to say that multiple-office holding is a New Jersey tradition and part of the New Jerseyan urban counter-culture to which we can also attribute large amounts of political shadiness and corruption, as well as a healthy dose of Latin American-style populism. Banning the practice was the final blow to a previous administration lead by multiple-office holder that epitomized the aura of one of his own, even if Woodbridge is not exactly a Newark of sorts. Yet unlike the conclusions found within other major works discussing multiple-office holding, or, rather, one of if not the only major work on multiple-office holding in New Jersey, Tom O'Neill's *One to a Customer: The Democratic Downsides of Dual-Office Holding*, the goal of this work was to open a window into a world few in the political realm seem to have been able to identify. It is purely intended to be explanatory, not prescriptive. There was never a persuasive intent in this piece one way or the other, and that is because I did not feel properly equipped to form an opinion one way or the other before concluding my study and establishing the value of some facts of the matter over others. Now, at the conclusion of this piece,

I feel at liberty to take on the eight objections to multiple-office holding that O'Neill presents in his study (as this is not the focus of this study at all, I would like to conclude with a casual evaluation of these objections based on previous observation).

### **O'Neill's Eight Objections to Multiple-Office Holding**

In the executive summary of his study, O'Neill highlights eight basic objections to multiple-office holding which he expands upon in the body of the work. As he states them, dual-office holding:

- Insulates office holders from political accountability
- Frustrates the system of checks and balances among levels of government
  - Is a form of political double-dipping
  - Amplifies pork-barrel spending
- Blocks the political ladder to emerging aspirants
- Reinforces the state's predilection for localism, parochialism and fragmentation
- Creates "low-show" jobs that divide the time and attention of elected officials
  - Puts officials in a built-in conflict situation (O'Neill 6)

I will cede that not every single point O'Neill makes against multiple-office holding is completely invalid, yet, taking each one into consideration, it becomes clearer based on evidence from this study that many of these are severely overblown. Take, for example, the first point: holding more than one office limits political accountability. From discussions with Mayor Connors and Senator Sacco et al, it appears that in practice the opposite is true. Having more than one office bestows upon the politician more responsibilities: that of both his jobs. Having both of these responsibilities means that the public servant is more accountable to more people that depend on him. The also works in theory; if a public servant has two jobs, he also has two constituencies that often overlap. Not only, then, does this public servant have two sets of people depending on him for political aid, but as the groups overlap there is a substantial portion of the population that voted

him in that depend on the leader for more than one set of political needs. There is no clear way in which having more responsibility could possibly create less accountability. What's more, the politician is now responsible for maintaining more than one job, meaning the leader must win twice the number of elections he previously needed to. None of these factors create less accountability.

The argument that multiple-office holding frustrates the checks and balances system within the government has some weight to it, at least more than the previous point. If the legislative and executive branches are one in the same, then how is it possible for one to check the other? However, this takes very little sleep from me at night for one main reason: most multiple-office holders (with the very rare exception when the President of the State Senate becomes the Governor) hold positions within the same levels of different branches. That is to say, rarely do the people that write the laws for cities become mayors, and rarely if ever do state legislators become governors. Because the offices are separated vertically by their respective levels of government, the jobs are not playing the same game of checks and balances with each other. That is to say, they are apples and oranges to each other. O'Neill's third point is redundant and meaningless, and his fourth is only objectionable if one does not recognize the spin inherent in using the phrase "pork-barrel spending". "Double-dipping" and multiple-office holding are synonymous (his second argument is much like saying that running a town is a form of governing). Moreover, there are many positive initiatives that go through the legislative process because there is a member of the legislature present that understands more thoroughly the way in which bills affect towns. This is a point

Mayor Connors emphasized during our interview and one which is verified by the improvements in Union City visible after its mayor became state senator, such as several new parks and a brand new high school. In a city where the two current high schools were so overpopulated that many teachers had classrooms of 30+ children, it is difficult to reduce a new educational facility to mere “pork-barrel spending”.

It is near impossible to argue that having fewer individuals employed in more jobs makes it more difficult for other individuals to rise and take over, so this point I will not argue (again, I do not pretend to point out that every downside to multiple-office holding is false). Nor will I argue against the fact that multiple-office holding instills in a state that is already culturally fragmented an increased awareness in the political and cultural differences that exist among regions. On this point, however, I will argue that O’Neill is wrong in fearing this result. Here he may be following Paul Peterson’s line of thought that cities and towns are extremely dependent on higher levels of power, thus rendering any study of the town as a city-state somewhat obsolete. However, it is just as dangerous to attempt to govern places with measurably different political cultures in the same way, both on a micro and macro scale. Attempting to “bring” democracy to Iraq is just as much of a failure as removing, say, the Board of Chosen Freeholders from every city in New Jersey and replacing it with other types of county governments found elsewhere. On many occasions, from Surf City to North Bergen, multiple-office holding has been a success story. That it cannot be so in places like Cape

May that are vastly different in its needs and requirements does not make it a complete failure.

O'Neill's last two arguments, that dual-office holding creates "low-show" jobs and creates natural conflicts of interest contradict each other somewhat. The assumption in the "low-show" argument is that the dual-office holder will only take one of his responsibilities seriously, thus making the other one (usually the one that the dual-office holder needs to commute to) a "low-show" job. It generates apathy towards at least one of the jobs, the argument goes. Yet, if the multiple-office holder inherently begins not to care about one of the jobs, how would this create a conflict of interest? It would, surely, create a power vacuum where someone should be executing a task and is too busy with the other job, but for a conflict of interest to arise, if such a thing exists, the dual-office holder needs to be fully committed to both jobs such that he or she is conflicted about what decision to make. Otherwise every decision would have the interests of the one job the politician cares about in mind. What's more, to resurrect another argument from Chapter 5, there is no reason for there to be conflicts of interest, since many constituencies overlap such that their interests overlap as well, and even when they do not it is highly uncommon for two constituencies to have diametrically opposed interests. Moreover, there are many practices that are legal and present even greater conflicts of interest, such as practicing lawyers working as legislators. Many legislators have clients with which they work who would benefit from specific pieces of legislation. This inherently tarnishes the legislator's voting integrity yet violates no laws.

The verdict in the court of public opinion is still out on multiple-office holding, and certainly there is plenty of time left for the current double-dippers to reverse the current law. Just as there are a number of negative repercussions to having one person hold several major responsibilities in a government, however, it is important to take into consideration the other side. The future of multiple-office holding, despite its recent ban, is extremely open-ended, as it appears that neither the benefits outweigh the costs nor vice-versa on general terms, though in the urban areas that prefer the practice there does seem to be some greater benefit to its establishment. Perhaps a future political coup similar to the one that ousted McGreevey will remove Corzine and put a multiple-office holder in his place. Or perhaps it will take enough time for the extinction of multiple-office holders to become clearer for the legislature to come to the conclusion that the practice was not all that bad, after all. Either way, one thing is for certain: all of this could only happen in New Jersey.



## **Bibliography**

- Acosta, Silvio. "El Senador Incognito." The Political Reporter. 20 Mar 2000.
- Amato, Matthew. "On the Streets Where We Live: Brian P. Stack." Hudson Reporter. 2 Oct 2005. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.union-city-nj.org/modules/news/article.php?storyid=32>>.
- Anonymous. "Stack Scandal: Brian Stack is Hudson County's Dirty Mayor." 12 Aug 2008 <<http://www.stackscandal.com/>>.
- "Brian Stack- District 6." Hudson County, New Jersey. County of Hudson, 2003. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.hudsoncountynj.org/gov/bio-stack.asp>>.
- Brian P. Stack for State Senate. "Believe" [Video] 10 May 2007. 9 Mar 2009 <[http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g4It\\_7ATSjo](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g4It_7ATSjo)>.
- Brown, M. Craig and Charles N. Halaby. "Machine Politics in America, 1870-1945." Journal of Interdisciplinary History 17.3 (Winter 1987): 587-612.
- Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall and David H. Tabb, eds. Racial Politics in American Cities. White Plains, NY: Longman Publishers, 1997.
- "Casinos to be Casualty of New Jersey Government Shutdown." Fox News. 2 July 2006. 21 Feb 2009 <<http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2006/07/02/casinos-casualty-new-jersey-government-shutdown/>>.
- Chen, David W. "11 Arrested in New Jersey Corruption Inquiry." New York Times. NY/Regional Section. 7 Sep 2007. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/nyregion/07corrupt.html>>.
- Chen, David W. and Richard Jones. "Corzine Asks New Jersey to Bite a Fiscal Bullet." New York Times. NY/Regional Section. 26 March 2006. 9 Mar

2009 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/nyregion/23jersey.html?pagewanted=print>>.

Cleary, John J. "Journalism and Literature in Trenton." A History of Trenton 1679-1929. Trenton, NJ: Trenton Historical Society, 1929.  
<<http://trentonhistory.org/His/journalism.htm>>.

Conklin, Gene B. "Plural Office Holding". Oregon Law Review 28 (1948-49): 332-361.

Cumberland County, New Jersey. 2008. Cumberland County Government, NJ. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.co.cumberland.nj.us/content/159/3747.aspx>>.

D'Ambrosio, Paul et al. "Profiting from Public Service." Asbury Park Press, Oct 2004 (series).

Edge, Wally. "Bernie Kenny." Politicker NJ. 19 Dec 2007. 9 Mar 2009  
<<http://www.politickernj.com/bernie-kenny-14823>>.

Edge, Wally. "In Hudson County, It's the Sequel to Menendez v. Garcia." Politicker NJ. 2 Feb 2007. 9 Mar 2009  
<<http://www.politickernj.com/hudson-county-its-sequel-menendez-v-garcia>>.

Edge, Wally. "Nine Years Later, a Clear Winner in Union City's Civil War." Politicker NJ. 29 Jan 2009. 9 Mar 2009  
<<http://www.politickernj.com/wallye/26987/nine-years-later-clear-winner-union-citys-civil-war>>.

Edge, Wally. "Shocking News from Hudson: Allegations that a High-Dollar Job was Created Just for a Politician." Politicker NJ. 24 Apr 2007. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://www.politickernj.com/shocking-news-hudson-allegations-high-dollar-job-was-created-just-politician-7683>>.

Erie, Steven P. Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988.

“Fact Sheet: United States Area Code 07087 (Union City, NJ).” US Census Factfinder. 5 Dec 2008

<[http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?\\_event=Search&geo\\_id=&\\_geoContext=&\\_street=&\\_county=07078&\\_cityTown=07087&\\_state=&\\_zip=07078&\\_lang=en&\\_sse=on&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010&show\\_2003\\_tab=&redirect=Y](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo_id=&_geoContext=&_street=&_county=07078&_cityTown=07087&_state=&_zip=07078&_lang=en&_sse=on&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010&show_2003_tab=&redirect=Y)>.

“Fact Sheet: United States: Atlantic County, NJ.” US Census Factfinder. 16 Nov 2008<[http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?\\_event=Search&geo\\_id=&\\_geoContext=&\\_street=&\\_county=atlantic+county&\\_cityTown=atlantic+county&\\_state=04000US34&\\_zip=&\\_lang=en&\\_sse=on&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo_id=&_geoContext=&_street=&_county=atlantic+county&_cityTown=atlantic+county&_state=04000US34&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010)>.

“Fact Sheet: United States: Bergen County, NJ.” US Census Factfinder. 16 Nov 2008 <[http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?\\_event=ChangeGeoContext&geo\\_id=05000US34003&\\_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US34&\\_street=&\\_county=bergen&\\_cityTown=bergen&\\_state=04000US34&\\_zip=&\\_lang=en&\\_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&\\_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010&\\_submenuId=factsheet\\_1&ds\\_name=ACS\\_20](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=ChangeGeoContext&geo_id=05000US34003&_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US34&_street=&_county=bergen&_cityTown=bergen&_state=04000US34&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=ACS_20)>

07\_3YR\_SAFF&\_ci\_nbr=null&qr\_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&\_keyword=&\_industry=>.

“Fact Sheet: United States: Hudson County, NJ.” US Census Factfinder. 20 Nov 2008<[http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?\\_event=Search&geo\\_id=05000US34003&\\_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US34%7C05000US34003&\\_street=&\\_county=HUDSON+COUNTY&\\_cityTown=HUDSON+COUNTY&\\_state=04000US34&\\_zip=&\\_lang=en&\\_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&\\_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=050&\\_submenuId=factsheet\\_1&ds\\_name=ACS\\_2007\\_3YR\\_SAFF&\\_ci\\_nbr=null&qr\\_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&\\_keyword=&\\_industry=>](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo_id=05000US34003&_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US34%7C05000US34003&_street=&_county=HUDSON+COUNTY&_cityTown=HUDSON+COUNTY&_state=04000US34&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=050&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=ACS_2007_3YR_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry=>)>.

“Fact Sheet: United States: New Jersey.” US Census Factfinder. 5 Dec 2008 <[http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?\\_event=Search&geo\\_id=&\\_geoContext=&\\_street=&\\_county=&\\_cityTown=&\\_state=04000US34&\\_zip=&\\_lang=en&\\_sse=on&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo_id=&_geoContext=&_street=&_county=&_cityTown=&_state=04000US34&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010)>.

“Fact Sheet: United States: Surf City, NJ.” US Census Factfinder. 10 Dec 2008 <[http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?\\_event=Search&geo\\_id=05000US34017&\\_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US34%7C05000US34017&\\_street=&\\_county=Surf+City&\\_cityTown=Surf+City&\\_state=04000US34&\\_zip=&\\_lang=en&\\_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&\\_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=050&\\_submenuId=factsheet\\_1&ds\\_name=ACS\\_2007\\_3YR\\_SAFF&\\_ci\\_nbr=null&qr\\_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&\\_keyword=&\\_industry=&show\\_2003\\_tab=&redirect=Y](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo_id=05000US34017&_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US34%7C05000US34017&_street=&_county=Surf+City&_cityTown=Surf+City&_state=04000US34&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=050&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=ACS_2007_3YR_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry=&show_2003_tab=&redirect=Y)>.

“Fact Sheet: United States: West New York, NJ.” US Census Factfinder. 5 Dec

2008<[Feuer, Alan and Nate Schweber. “Former Newark Mayor is Sentenced to 27 Months.” New York Times. NY/Regional Section. 30 Jul 2008. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/nyregion/30james.html?hp>>.](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo_id=86000US07043&_geoContext=01000US%7C86000US07043&_street=&_county=west+new+york&_cityTown=west+new+york&_state=04000US34&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=860&_submenuId=factsheet_1&ds_name=DEC_2000_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_keyword=&_industry=>.</a></p></div><div data-bbox=)

Fitzgerald’s Manual of the Legislature of New Jersey. Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Lawyers Diary and Manual, 1908-2008.

Friedman, Matt. “Stack Celebrates Landslide Win.” Politicker NJ. 5 Jun 2007. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.politickernj.com/stack-celebrates-landslide-win-9105>>.

Friedman, Matt. “Peace in Hudson County.” Politicker NJ. 11 Dec 2007. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.politickernj.com/peace-hudson-county-14647>>.

“Glossary of Terms.” NJ Legislature 2002 Office of New Jersey Legislative Services. 5 December 2008 <<http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/glossary.asp>>.

Greenstein, Fred I. “The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics”. American Academy of Political and Social Science 353 (May 1964): 1-13.

Guenther, Alan and Jean Mikle. "Critics Fault Exceptions to Dual-Office Ban."

Asbury Park Press. 5 Oct 2007. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://www.app.com/article/20071005/NEWS/710050390/0/SPECIAL10>>.

Guterbock, Thomas. Machine Politics in Transition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Michael Johnston, eds. Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002.

"Historical Information." NJ Legislature 2002 Office of New Jersey Legislative Services. 5 December 2008

<<http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/history.asp>>.

Hluchan, Sarah Kathleen. "Dual Office Holding." Georgetown Public Policy Review Online. 15 Jan 2007. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/GPPIReview/index.cfm?tpl=article&articleID=88>>.

"Hold That Pen." Bergen Record. Local Section. 26 Mar 2007. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-136999978.html>>

Horowitz, Craig. "Jim McGreevey and His Main Man." New York Magazine. 13 Sep 2004. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/people/features/9874/>>.

"How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty (Official Measure)." Us Census Bureau. 26 Aug 2008. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/povdef.html>>.

Ingle, Robert and Sandy McClure. The Soprano State: New Jersey's Culture of Corruption. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2008.

Jennings, James ed. Blacks, Latinos, and Asians in Urban America. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994.

Jones, Richard. "Corzine Orders New Jersey Government Shutdown. New York Times. 2 July 2006. 20 Feb 2009

<<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/02/nyregion/02corzine.html?scp=1&sq=corzine%20government%20casinos&st=cse>>.

Koepp, Paul and Charles Hack. "West New York Mayor Sal Vega Hit With Sexual Harassment Lawsuit." Jersey Journal 7 December 2008. 7 December 2008

<[http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2008/12/west\\_new\\_york\\_mayor\\_sal\\_vega\\_h.html](http://www.nj.com/hudson/index.ssf/2008/12/west_new_york_mayor_sal_vega_h.html)>.

"Legislative District Data-Book Online," Rutgers Bloustein School of Planning and Public Policy, 2 Nov 2008  
<<http://www.njdataonline.com/default.asp#>>.

Martin, Jack. The Immigrant Population of the United States in 2006. Federation for American Immigration Reform, 2006. 2 Nov 2008:

<[http://www.fairus.org%2Fsite%2FDocServer%2F06USFBPOP.pdf%3FdocID%3D1561&ei=\\_EgPSefLD4XGeqWuqaYE&usg=AFQjCNEjXdOL2smVQttCAp1uol\\_-g18NYQ&sig2=cA1OczxllxzOUygWeLS1ZA](http://www.fairus.org%2Fsite%2FDocServer%2F06USFBPOP.pdf%3FdocID%3D1561&ei=_EgPSefLD4XGeqWuqaYE&usg=AFQjCNEjXdOL2smVQttCAp1uol_-g18NYQ&sig2=cA1OczxllxzOUygWeLS1ZA)>.

Mayhew, David. Placing Parties in American Politics: Organization, Electoral Settings, and Government Activity in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986.

McGreevey, James E. "I am a Gay American." Resignation Speech, NJ Statehouse, Trenton, NJ, 13 Aug 2004.

McNichol, Dunstan. "Corzine Demands Measure Banning Dual Office Holding."

The Star-Ledger. 20 Jan 2007. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://209.18.101.210/gsc/Announcements/1-20-07%20Information%20-%20CAPs%20legislation%20&%20major%20negative%20impact%20on%20property%20taxes%20due%20to%20lack%20of%20state%20aid%20in%20recent%20past.html>>.

Miller, Jonathan. "Judge Decides Against a Mayor Who Banned Cuban Parade."

NY/Regional Section. 31 May 2007. 9 Mar 2009

<[http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/nyregion/31parade.html?\\_r=1&scp=3&sq=silverio+vega&st=nyt](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/nyregion/31parade.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=silverio+vega&st=nyt)>.

Miller, Jonathan. "Saying Cuba's Pain is Ignored, a Mayor Blocks a Cuban

Parade." New York Times. NY/Regional Section. 23 May 2007. 9 Mar

2009 <<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/24/nyregion/24parade.html>>.

"New Jersey Population Distribution (Map)." U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Summary

File 1. LawrenceYerkes.com. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://www.lawrenceyerkes.com/html/rmx-NJ-New-Jersey-fast-facts.htm>>.



New Jersey State Senate. 212<sup>th</sup> Legislature. S.3008, Prohibits Newly Elected Public Office Holders from Simultaneously Holding More than One Elective Office [introduced in the NJ State Senate 18 Jun 2007].

“No More Dual-Office Holding; Corzine to Sign Bill Tomorrow.” *Associated Press*. 3 Sep 2007. 9 Mar 2009

<[http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates/2007/09/no\\_more\\_dualoffice\\_holding\\_cor.html](http://blog.nj.com/ledgerupdates/2007/09/no_more_dualoffice_holding_cor.html)>.

O'Neill, Tom. “One to a Customer: The Democratic Downsides of Dual Office Holding.” Trenton, NJ: New Jersey Policy Perspective/DEMOS, 2006. <[http://www.njpp.org/rpt\\_onetoacust.html](http://www.njpp.org/rpt_onetoacust.html)>.

Peterson, Paul E. City Limits. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

“Pinelands National Reserve.” US National Park Service- Dept. of the Interior. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.nps.gov/pine/>>.

Pizarro, Max. “GOP Bemoan Weak Dual Office Bill and Vote “Aye”. Politicker NJ. 11 Jun 2007. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.politickernj.com/gop-bemoan-weak-dual-office-holding-bill-and-vote-aye-9316>>.

Pizarro, Max. “Sal Vega.” Politicker NJ. 23 May 2007. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.politickernj.com/sal-vega-8746>>.

Pizarro, Max. “Senate Passes Dual Office Holding Ban.” Politicker NJ. 21 Jun 2007. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.politickernj.com/senate-passes-dual-office-holding-ban-9906>>.

Pizarro, Max. “Vega Itching for a Scrap with Stack.” Politicker NJ. 4 Apr 2007. 9 Mar 2009 <<http://www.politickernj.com/vega-itching-scrap-stack-6973>>.

‘Poverty Benchmarks 2009: Assessing New Jersey’s Advances, Declines, and growing Challenges in Addressing Problems of Inadequate Income.’

Legal Services of New Jersey Poverty Research Institute, 2008.

Robinson, Frank. Machine Politics: a Study of Albany’s O’Connells. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1976.

Reitmeyer, John. “UPDATE: Christie Launches Campaign for Governor.”

NorthJersey.com. 4 February 2009. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://www.northjersey.com/politics/christie020409.html>>.

Rich, Wilbur C. ed. The Politics of Minority Coalitions: Race, Ethnicity, and Shared Uncertainties. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.

Richards, Clay. “Corzine has 7-Point Lead One Day Before Election, Quinnipiac

University Poll Finds.” Quinnipiac University Polling Institute. 5 Nov 2005. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x1299.xml?ReleaseID=845>>.

Samson, Peter J. “North Bergen Informant Gets Light Prison Term.” The (Bergen) Record. 15 Jun 2004, local section, all Bergen editions.

Scott, John C. “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change.” Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts. Eds. Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002.

Schwaneberg, Robert. “More State Lawmakers Hold Multiple Offices, Despite Change in Law.” The Star Ledger. 23 March 2008. 7 Mar 2009

<[http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/03/despite\\_new\\_law\\_doubledipping.html](http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/03/despite_new_law_doubledipping.html)>.

Smothers, Ronald. "Former North Bergen Official is Charged with Corruption."

New York Times. 7 Jun 2002. 9 Mar 2009

<<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9800E1DF143DF934A35755C0A9649C8B63>>.

Sonenshein, Rafael. Politics in Black and White. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Staab, Amanda. "Petition to 'Heal' West New York." Hudson County Reporter.

West New York Section. 10 Feb 2009. 9 Mar 2009

<[http://www.hudsonreporter.com/pages/full\\_story?page\\_label=results\\_content&id=1399463-](http://www.hudsonreporter.com/pages/full_story?page_label=results_content&id=1399463-Petition+to+%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99+West+New+York-Local+doctor+starts+mayoral+recall-&article-Petition%20to%20%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99%20West%20New%20York-Local%20doctor%20starts%20mayoral%20recall-%20=&widget=push&open=&)

[Petition+to+%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99+West+New+York-](http://www.hudsonreporter.com/pages/full_story?page_label=results_content&id=1399463-Petition+to+%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99+West+New+York-Local+doctor+starts+mayoral+recall-&article-Petition%20to%20%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99%20West%20New%20York-Local%20doctor%20starts%20mayoral%20recall-%20=&widget=push&open=&)

[Local+doctor+starts+mayoral+recall-&article-](http://www.hudsonreporter.com/pages/full_story?page_label=results_content&id=1399463-Petition+to+%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99+West+New+York-Local+doctor+starts+mayoral+recall-&article-Petition%20to%20%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99%20West%20New%20York-Local%20doctor%20starts%20mayoral%20recall-%20=&widget=push&open=&)

[Petition%20to%20%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99%20West%20New%20](http://www.hudsonreporter.com/pages/full_story?page_label=results_content&id=1399463-Petition+to+%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99+West+New+York-Local+doctor+starts+mayoral+recall-&article-Petition%20to%20%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99%20West%20New%20York-Local%20doctor%20starts%20mayoral%20recall-%20=&widget=push&open=&)

[York-Local%20doctor%20starts%20mayoral%20recall-](http://www.hudsonreporter.com/pages/full_story?page_label=results_content&id=1399463-Petition+to+%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99+West+New+York-Local+doctor+starts+mayoral+recall-&article-Petition%20to%20%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99%20West%20New%20York-Local%20doctor%20starts%20mayoral%20recall-%20=&widget=push&open=&)

[%20=&widget=push&open=&](http://www.hudsonreporter.com/pages/full_story?page_label=results_content&id=1399463-Petition+to+%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99+West+New+York-Local+doctor+starts+mayoral+recall-&article-Petition%20to%20%E2%80%98heal%E2%80%99%20West%20New%20York-Local%20doctor%20starts%20mayoral%20recall-%20=&widget=push&open=&)>.

Stone, Clarence N. "Urban Political Machines: Taking Stock." PS: Political Science and Politics 29.3 (Sep 1996): 446-450.

Strunsky, Steve. "A Former Sports Star Finds Politics a Rougher Field." New York Times 22 Oct 2000. 4 Dec 2008

<<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0DE2D6123EF931A15753C1A9669C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=3>>.

U.S. Census Bureau. "Population Finder". American FactFinder. 2 Nov 2008 <

[http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?\\_event=&geo\\_id=16](http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?_event=&geo_id=16)

[000US3474630&\\_geoContext=01000US%7C04000US34%7C16000US3474630&\\_street=&\\_county=union+city&\\_cityTown=union+city&\\_state=04000US34&\\_zip=&\\_lang=en&\\_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=geoSelect&\\_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=160&\\_submenuId=population\\_0&ds\\_name=null&\\_ci\\_nbr=null&q\\_r\\_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&\\_keyword=&\\_industry=>](#).

Weissman, Stephen R. "White Ethnicity and Urban Politics in the Seventies: The Case of Jersey City". Polity 9.2 (Winter 1976): 182-207.

"What is a Freeholder?" Official Website of Bergen County, NJ. 6 Dec 2008

<<http://www.co.bergen.nj.us/freeholders/whatisafreeholder.html>>.

Whelan, Jeff. "Former Newark Mayor Sharpe James Reports to Prison on

Monday." The Star Ledger 11 Sep 2008. 7 December 2008

<[http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/09/sharpe\\_james\\_to\\_be\\_behind\\_bars.html](http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/09/sharpe_james_to_be_behind_bars.html)>.

Wu, Sen-Yuan. "Estimates of Foreign-born Population in New Jersey: 2000."

New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development. Workforce New Jersey Public Information Network. Oct 2008. 20 Nov 2008

<[http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/dmograph/adprof/adp\\_index.html](http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lpa/dmograph/adprof/adp_index.html)>.

## **Appendices**

Appendix A

Index of Interviewees

**Silvio Acosta-** Human rights activist against the torture of Cuban political prisoners for 20+ years in West New York, NJ. Director of local newsletter *The Political Reporter* and active supporter of Brian P. Stack for State Senate.....77, 79

**Anonymous Brian Stack Supporter**.....4

**Leonard Connors-** Mayor of Surf City, NJ since 1966 and dual-office holder (State Senator for District 9) from 1982-2008.....85-87

**Manuel Hernandez-** Union City resident attending Brian Stack “Bringing the Government to the People” Event.....5

**Bob Ingle-** Trenton Bureau chief of Gannett newspapers and author of *The Soprano State*.....44, 59-60

**Nicholas Sacco-** Mayor of North Bergen, NJ and State Senator for District 32 since 1991 and North Bergen Superintendent of Schools since 1985.....48, 84-86, 89

## Appendix B

### *Index of Figures*

<b>Figure 2.1: Multiple-Office Holding in the New Jersey Legislature, 1934-2008.....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Figure 2.2: Multiple-Office Holding in the New Jersey Legislature 1987-2008.....</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>Figure 2.3: Multiple-Office Holding 1988-2008 by Party.....</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>Figure 4.1: Population Density in New Jersey, 2000.....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>Figure 4.2: Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey by County, 1988-2008.....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>Figure 4.3: Multiple-Office Holding in New Jersey by District, 1988-2008.....</b>	<b>66</b>
<b>Figure 4.4: Percentage of Foreign-Born and Poverty-Stricken Individuals in New Jersey, 2000.....</b>	<b>71</b>

## Appendix C

### *List of Multiple-Office Holders in NJ Legislature in the Past 20 Years*

<i>Red- Republican</i>		<i>Blue- Democratic</i>		
<u>Year</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Chamber</u>	<u>County</u>	<u>District</u>
2008	Stephen Sweeney	S	Cumberland	3
2008	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
2008	Paul Sarlo	A	Bergen	36
2008	Paul Moriarty	A	Camden	4
2008	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
2008	Joseph Egan	A	Somerset	17
2008	John Burzichelli	A	Salem	3
2008	Gary Schaer	A	Passaic	36
2008	Dana Redd	S	Camden	5
2008	Brian Stack	S	Hudson	33
2008	Scott Rudder	A	Burlington	38
2008	Ronald Dancer	A	Ocean	30
2008	Daniel Van Pelt	A	Ocean	9
2008	Brian Rumpf	A	Ocean	9
2007	Valerie Vainieri Huttie	A	Bergen	37
2007	Uprenda Chivukula	A	Somerset	17
2007	Stephen Sweeney	S	Cumberland	3
2007	Silverio Vega	A	Hudson	33
2007	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
2007	Paul Sarlo	A	Bergen	36
2007	Paul Moriarty	A	Camden	4
2007	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
2007	Mims Hackett	A	Essex	27
2007	Joseph Egan	A	Somerset	17
2007	Joseph Doria	S	Hudson	31
2007	John McKeon	A	Essex	27
2007	John Burzichelli	A	Salem	3
2007	Gary Schaer	A	Passaic	36
2007	Brian Stack	A	Hudson	33
2007	Ronald Dancer	A	Ocean	30
2007	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
2007	Marcia Karrow	A	Hunterdon	23
2007	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
2007	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
2007	James McCullough	S	Atlantic	2
2007	Brian Rumpf	A	Ocean	9
2006	Valerie Vainieri Huttie	A	Bergen	37
2006	Uprenda Chivukula	A	Somerset	17



2006	Stephen Sweeney	S	Gloucester	3
2006	Sharpe James	S	Union	29
2006	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
2006	Paul Sarlo	A	Bergen	36
2006	Paul Moriarty	A	Camden	4
2006	Pamela Lampitt	A	Camden	6
2006	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
2006	Mims Hackett	A	Essex	27
2006	Joseph Egan	A	Somerset	17
2006	Joseph Doria	S	Hudson	31
2006	John McKeon	A	Essex	27
2006	John Burzichelli	A	Salem	3
2006	Joan Voss	A	Bergen	38
2006	Gary Schaer	A	Passaic	36
2006	Brian Stack	A	Hudson	33
2006	Albio Sires	A	Hudson	33
2006	Ronald Dancer	A	Ocean	30
2006	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
2006	Marcia Karrow	A	Hunterdon	23
2006	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
2006	Jennifer Beck	A	Monmouth	12
2006	Brian Rumpf	A	Ocean	9
2005	Uprenda Chivukula	A	Somerset	17
2005	Stephen Sweeney	S	Gloucester	3
2005	Sharpe James	S	Union	29
2005	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
2005	Peter Eagler	A	Passaic	34
2005	Paul Sarlo	A	Bergen	36
2005	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
2005	Mims Hackett	A	Essex	27
2005	Joseph Egan	A	Somerset	17
2005	Joseph Doria	S	Hudson	31
2005	John McKeon	A	Essex	27
2005	John Burzichelli	A	Salem	3
2005	Joan Voss	A	Bergen	38
2005	Donald Tucker	A	Essex	29
2005	Brian Stack	A	Hudson	33
2005	Anthony Chiappone	A	Hudson	31
2005	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
2005	Albio Sires	A	Hudson	33
2005	Ronald Dancer	A	Ocean	30
2005	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
2005	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
2005	Brian Rumpf	A	Ocean	9
2004	Uprenda Chivukula	A	Somerset	17
2004	Stephen Sweeney	S	Gloucester	3
2004	Sharpe James	S	Union	29

2004	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
2004	Peter Eagler	A	Passaic	34
2004	Paul Sarlo	S	Bergen	36
2004	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
2004	Mims Hackett	A	Essex	27
2004	Joseph Egan	A	Somerset	17
2004	John McKeon	A	Essex	27
2004	John Burzichelli	A	Salem	3
2004	Glenn Cunningham	S	Hudson	31
2004	Donald Tucker	A	Essex	29
2004	Brian Stack	A	Hudson	33
2004	Anthony Chiappone	A	Hudson	31
2004	Albio Sires	A	Hudson	33
2004	Ronald Dancer	A	Ocean	30
2004	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
2004	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
2004	Brian Rumpf	A	Ocean	9
2003	Uprenda Chivukula	A	Somerset	17
2003	Stephen Sweeney	S	Gloucester	3
2003	Sharpe James	S	Union	29
2003	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
2003	Peter Eagler	A	Passaic	34
2003	Paul Sarlo	A	Bergen	36
2003	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
2003	Mims Hackett	A	Essex	27
2003	Joseph Suliga	A	Bergen	20
2003	Joseph Egan	A	Somerset	17
2003	Joseph Doria	A	Hudson	31
2003	John McKeon	A	Essex	27
2003	John Burzichelli	A	Salem	3
2003	Garry Furnari	S	Essex	36
2003	Donald Tucker	A	Essex	29
2003	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
2003	Albio Sires	A	Hudson	33
2003	Ronald Dancer	A	Ocean	30
2003	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
2003	Paul D'Amato	A	Atlantic	2
2003	Michael Doherty	A	Warren	23
2003	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
2003	Joseph Pennacchio	A	Bergen	26
2002	Uprenda Chivukula	A	Somerset	17
2002	Stephen Sweeney	S	Gloucester	3
2002	Sharpe James	S	Union	29
2002	Rafael Fraguella	A	Hudson	33
2002	Peter Eagler	A	Passaic	34
2002	Paul Sarlo	A	Bergen	36
2002	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32

2002	Mims Hackett	A	Essex	27
2002	Joseph Suliga	A	Bergen	20
2002	Joseph Egan	A	Somerset	17
2002	Joseph Doria	A	Hudson	31
2002	John McKeon	A	Essex	27
2002	John Burzichelli	A	Salem	3
2002	Gordon Johnson	A	Bergen	37
2002	Garry Furnari	S	Essex	36
2002	Donald Tucker	A	Essex	29
2002	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
2002	Albio Sires	A	Hudson	33
2002	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
2002	Paul D'Amato	A	Atlantic	2
2002	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
2002	Joseph Pennacchio	A	Bergen	26
2002	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
2001	Sharpe James	S	Union	29
2001	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
2001	Joseph Suliga	A	Bergen	20
2001	Joseph Doria	A	Hudson	31
2001	Garry Furnari	S	Essex	36
2001	Donald Tucker	A	Essex	29
2001	Charles Zisa	A	Bergen	37
2001	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
2001	Albio Sires	A	Hudson	33
2001	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
2001	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
2001	Joseph Pennacchio	A	Bergen	26
2001	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
2001	Jack Sinagra	S	Middlesex	18
2000	Sharpe James	S	Union	29
2000	Raul Garcia	A	Hudson	33
2000	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
2000	Joseph Suliga	A	Bergen	20
2000	Joseph Doria	A	Hudson	31
2000	Garry Furnari	S	Essex	36
2000	Donald Tucker	A	Essex	29
2000	Charles Zisa	A	Bergen	37
2000	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
2000	Albio Sires	A	Hudson	33
2000	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
2000	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
2000	Larry Chatzidakis	A	Burlington	8
2000	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
2000	Jack Sinagra	S	Middlesex	18
1999	Raul Garcia	A	Hudson	33
1999	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32

1999	Joseph Suliga	A	Bergen	20
1999	Joseph Doria	A	Hudson	31
1999	Garry Furnari	S	Essex	36
1999	Donald Tucker	A	Essex	29
1999	Charles Zisa	A	Bergen	37
1999	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
1999	Paul Kramer	A	Mercer	14
1999	Melvin Cottrell	A	Burlington	30
1999	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1999	Larry Chatzidakis	A	Burlington	8
1999	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1999	Gerald J. Luongo	A	Camden	4
1998	Raul Garcia	A	Hudson	33
1998	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
1998	Joseph Suliga	A	Bergen	20
1998	Joseph Doria	A	Hudson	31
1998	Garry Furnari	S	Essex	36
1998	Donald Tucker	A	Union	29
1998	Charles Zisa	A	Bergen	37
1998	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
1998	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1998	Paul Kramer	A	Mercer	14
1998	Norman Robert	S	Passaic	34
1998	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1998	Larry Chatzidakis	A	Burlington?	8
1998	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1998	Jeffrey Moran	A	Ocean	9
1998	Gerald J. Luongo	A	Camden	4
1997	Willie Brown	A	Union	29
1997	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
1997	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
1997	Joseph Suliga	A	Bergen	20
1997	James McGreevey	S	Middlesex	19
1997	Jackie Mattison	A	Union	29
1997	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
1997	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1997	Paul Kramer	A	Mercer	14
1997	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1997	Larry Chatzidakis	A	Burlington?	8
1997	Joseph Malone	A	Burlington	30
1997	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1997	Jeffrey Moran	A	Ocean	9
1997	Jack Sinagra	S	Middlesex	18
1997	Carmine DeSopo	A	Burlington	7
1996	William Pascrell	A	Passaic	35
1996	Nicholas Sacco	A	Hudson	32
1996	Joseph Suliga	A	Bergen	20

1996	James McGreevey	S	Middlesex	19
1996	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
1996	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1996	Paul DiGaetano	A	Passaic	36
1996	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1996	Kenneth LeFevre	A	Atlantic	2
1996	Joseph Malone	A	Burlington	30
1996	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1996	Jack Sinagra	S	Middlesex	18
1996	Christopher Bateman	A	Somerset	16
1995	William Pascrell	A	Passaic	35
1995	Steven Petrillo	A	Burlington	7
1995	Nicholas Sacco	A	Hudson	32
1995	Joseph Suliga	A	Bergen	20
1995	James McGreevey	S	Middlesex	19
1995	Alfred Steele	A	Passaic	35
1995	Rose Marie Heck	A	Bergen	38
1995	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1995	Paul Kramer	A	Mercer	14
1995	Paul DiGaetano	A	Passaic	36
1995	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1995	Lee Solomon	A	Camden	6
1995	Joseph Malone	A	Burlington	30
1995	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1994	William Pascrell	A	Passaic	35
1994	Thomas Foley	A	Mercer	2
1994	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
1994	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
1994	Joseph Yuhas	A	Mercer	15
1994	Joseph Doria	A	Hudson	31
1994	James McGreevey	S	Middlesex	19
1994	Jackie Mattison	A	Union	29
1994	Rose Marie Heck	A	Bergen	38
1994	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1994	Paul DiGaetano	A	Passaic	36
1994	Melvin Cottrell	A	Burlington	30
1994	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1994	Joseph Malone	A	Burlington	30
1994	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1994	Jack Sinagra	S	Middlesex	18
1994	Christopher Bateman	A	Somerset	16
1993	William Pascrell	A	Passaic	35
1993	Steven Petrillo	A	Burlington	7
1993	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
1993	Nicholas Sacco	S	Hudson	32
1993	Joseph Doria	A	Hudson	31
1993	James McGreevey	S	Middlesex	19

1993	Jackie Mattison	A	Union	29
1993	Rose Marie Heck	A	Bergen	38
1993	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1993	Paul DiGaetano	A	Passaic	36
1993	Melvin Cottrell	A	Burlington	30
1993	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1993	Lee Solomon	A	Camden	6
1993	Joseph Malone	A	Burlington	30
1993	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1993	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1993	Jack Sinagra	S	Middlesex	18
1992	William Pascrell	A	Passaic	35
1992	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
1992	Robert Menendez	S	Hudson	33
1992	Richard Bagger	A	Union	22
1992	Jackie Mattison	A	Union	29
1992	Anthony Imprevuto	A	Hudson	32
1992	Stephen Mikulak	A	Middlesex	19
1992	Rose Marie Heck	A	Bergen	38
1992	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1992	Paul DiGaetano	A	Passaic	36
1992	Melvin Cottrell	A	Burlington	30
1992	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1992	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1992	Fredrick Nickles	A	Atlantic	2
1992	Bradford Smith	S	Burlington	7
1991	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
1991	Robert Menendez	A	Hudson	33
1991	Louis Gill	A	Passaic	39
1991	Jackie Mattison	A	Union	29
1991	Anthony Imprevuto	A	Hudson	32
1991	Ann Mullen	A	Camden	4
1991	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1991	Paul DiGaetano	A	Passaic	36
1991	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1991	John Rooney	A	Bergen	39
1991	John Gaffney	A	Atlantic	2
1991	Clare Farragher	A	Monmouth	12
1990	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
1990	Robert Menendez	S	Hudson	33
1990	Louis Gill	A	Passaic	39
1990	Jackie Mattison	A	Union	29
1990	George Otowski	A	Middlesex	19
1990	George Hudak	A	Middlesex	20
1990	Carmen Orechio	S	Essex	30
1990	Anthony Marsella	A	Camden	4
1990	Anthony Imprevuto	A	Hudson	32
1990	Ann Mullen	A	Gloucester	4
1990	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30

1990	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1989	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
1989	Robert Menendez	S	Hudson	33
1989	Louis Gill	A	Passaic	39
1989	Jackie Mattison	A	Union	29
1989	George Spadaro	A	Middlesex	18
1989	George Otlowski	A	Middlesex	19
1989	George Hudak	A	Middlesex	20
1989	Frank Graves	S	Passaic	34
1989	Carmen Orechio	S	Essex	30
1989	Anthony Marsella	A	Camden	4
1989	Anthony Imprevuto	A	Hudson	32
1989	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1989	Paul DiGaetano	A	Passaic	36
1989	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1989	John Hendrickson	A	Ocean	9
1989	J. Edward Kline	A	Atlantic	2
1988	Ronald Rice	S	Essex	28
1988	Robert Menendez	S	Hudson	33
1988	Louis Gill	A	Passaic	39
1988	John Lynch	S	Middlesex	17
1988	Jackie Mattison	A	Union	29
1988	George Spadaro	A	Middlesex	18
1988	George Otlowski	A	Middlesex	19
1988	George Hudak	A	Middlesex	20
1988	Frank Pallone	S	Monmouth	11
1988	Frank Graves	S	Passaic	34
1988	Carmen Orechio	S	Essex	30
1988	Anthony Marsella	A	Camden	4
1988	Anthony Imprevuto	A	Hudson	32
1988	Robert Singer	S	Monmouth	30
1988	Paul DiGaetano	A	Passaic	36
1988	Leonard Connors	S	Atlantic	9
1988	J. Edward Kline	A	Atlantic	2



**Appendix D**  
*Assorted Photographs*  
**Surf City, NJ**



An abandoned shack on the Surf City end of the Route 72 Bridge connecting mainland New Jersey to Long Beach Island, of which Surf City is one division. Photo August 2008, Frances Martel.



Left: State Senator Leonard Connors Jr. in his office in Surf City. Right: LBI's houses reach well into the multi-million-dollar range. Photo June 2006, Reuben Cox (*New York Magazine*).



## Union City, NJ



From Left: Union City Commissioner Tilo Rivas, Union City Mayor Brian Stack, West New York Commissioner Sal Vega, and Senator Robert Menendez walk in the 2005 Hudson County Cuban Day Parade. Vega and Stack would later run against each other for State Senate. Photo May 2005, Anonymous (Courtesy Emilio Del Valle)



Dominican Supporters of Union City Mayor Brian Stack demonstrate their solidarity with his campaign for State Senate in the 2007 Hispanic Day Parade in Hudson County. Photo June 2007, Frances Martel

**West New York, NJ**



The "Sal Vega Freedom Wagon" Drives Across Palisade Ave. in West New York, NJ during the 2007 State Senate Campaign. Photo c. May 2007, Unknown Photographer (Courtesy Silvio Acosta).



West New York Mayor Sal Vega poses with volunteers cleaning up a park by the Hudson River as part of the city's "Pride Campaign". Photo c. 2008, Unknown Photographer (Courtesy Silvio Acosta)





Brian P. Stack, then a civilian, walking Bergenline Avenue with a group of volunteers on his cleaning Union City tour. Photo c. 1999, Rafael Martel



José R. Martel, a local Cuban octogenarian, waves a flag at the 2008 Cuban Day Parade as the 95.7 FM Radio wagon drives by. Photo June 2008, Frances Martel



A poster on 45<sup>th</sup> Street and Bergenline Ave. in Union City in support of Brian Stack for state senate. The poster still currently stands over the busy market street. Photo June 2008, Frances Martel



Brian Stack reacts to first news of his victory against Sal Vega in the 2007 state senate elections while volunteer John Medina cheers him on at a Union City voting station. Photo June 5, 2007, Frances Martel